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WHO OWNS HUMAN CAPITAL?
LILY KAHNG*
ABSTRACT
This Article analyzes the tax law's capital income preference through
the lens of intellectual capital, an increasingly important driver of
economic productivity whose value derives primarily from workers'
knowledge, experience and skills. The Article discusses how business
owners increasingly are able to "propertize" labor into intellectual
capital-to capture the returns on their workers' labor by embedding it in
intellectual property and to restrict workers' ability to employ their skills
and knowledge elsewhere. The Article then shows how the tax law
provides significant subsidies to the process of propertization and thereby
contributes to the inequitable distribution of returns between business
owners and workers. The Article's analysis further reveals the tax law's
fundamental capital-labor distinction to be questionable, perhaps even
illusory, an insight which has profound implications for the tax law.
INTRODUCTION
The U.S. income tax makes a fundamental distinction between income
from labor and income from capital, upon which substantially different tax
treatment depends. Originally, the income tax targeted wealthy capital
owners, and most wage earners were exempt from it.' However, the advent
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1. See JOHN WITTE, THE POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 77
(1985). Income from labor was thought to be morally superior to income from capital because it
embodied the Protestant work ethic and the democratic ideal of meritocracy. See Marjorie E.
Komhauser, The Morality of Money: American Attitudes Toward Wealth and the Income Tax, 70 IND.
L.J. 119, 128-29 (1994). Moreover, as John Stuart Mill argued, those who work for a living have less
ability to pay taxes than those who live off accumulated capital because they have only a finite period
of time in which they can work and must save for retirement and illness. See 2 JOHN STUART MILL,
PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 315 (1899).
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of World War II shifted its impact to labor income, transforming it from a
tax on the rich to a tax on working people, from "class tax to mass tax. '
Today, we tax capital income preferentially in a variety of ways, most
prominently through a reduced rate of tax on capital gains and dividends.
3
The preference for capital income has been the subject of intense study
and debate for many years.4 For the past couple of decades, efficiency-
based arguments in favor of a capital income preference have dominated
2. Carolyn C. Jones, Class Tax to Mass Tax: The Role of Propaganda in the Expansion of the
Income Tax During World War 11, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 685 (1989); see also Lily Kahng, Investment
Income Withholding in the United States and Germany, 10 FLA. TAX REV. 315, 316-20 (2010)
(describing the expansion of the income tax). See generally Ajay K. Mehrotra & Julia C. Ott, The
Curious Beginnings of the Capital Gains Tax Preference, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2517 (2016)
(describing the development of the capital gains preference).
3. The maximum capital gains rate is twenty percent; the maximum rate on ordinary income is
39.6 percent. 1.R.C. § 1 (2012). These maximum rates do not include Affordable Care Act surtaxes.
The capital gains rate is applicable to long-term capital gains and dividends. Other forms of income
from capital, such as interest, rents and royalties, are subject to tax at ordinary income rates.
Income from capital is treated favorably in a variety of other ways. Notably, only labor income,
and not capital income, is subject to additional social security and retirement taxes, collectively known
as payroll taxes. During the last thirty years, payroll taxes have accounted for one-third or more of
annual total tax revenues. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, HISTORICAL TABLES: TABLE 2.2 -
PERCENTAGE COMPOSITION OF RECEIPTS BY SOURCE: 1934-2001 (last visited Mar. 20, 2016),
https://www.whitehouse. gov/omb/budget/Historicals. See generally Patricia E. Dilley, Breaking the
Glass Slipper-Reflections on the Self-Employment Tax, 54 TAX LAW. 65 (2000) (analyzing self-
employment taxes); Deborah A. Geier, Integrating the Tax Burdens of the Federal Income and Payroll
Taxes on Labor Income, 22 VA. TAX REV. 1 (2002) (arguing for the integration of income and payroll
taxes); Linda Sugin, Payroll Taxes, Mythology, and Fairness, 51 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 113 (2014)
(arguing that payroll taxes unfairly burden labor income relative to investment income.
Furthermore, capital owners can defer gains until realization or avoid taxation entirely through
basis step up at death. 1.R.C. § 1014. Edward McCaffery formulated a memorable summary of all a
taxpayer needs to do to avoid income and estate tax on financial capital: "Buy, Borrow, Die." Edward
J. McCaffery, A New Understanding of Tax, 103 MICH. L. REV. 807, 890 (2005). See generally
William J. Tumier, Theory Meets Reality: The Case of the Double Tax on Material Capital, 27 VA.
TAX REV. 83 (2007) (detailing comprehensively ways in which income from capital and income from
labor are treated differently).
Capital income is not always treated more favorably than labor income. It is easy to come up with
examples to the contrary. Thus, for example, dividend income is nominally taxed twice under our
classical system of corporate taxation, first at the corporate level when earned, and then at the
shareholder level when distributed. See generally Jennifer Arlen & Deborah M. Weiss, A Political
Theory of Corporate Taxation, 105 YALE L.J. 325 (1995); Terrence R. Chorvat, Apologia for the
Double Taxation of Corporate Income, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 239 (2003). An example of a labor
income preference is the earned income tax credit, which results in a negative tax rate for low income
taxpayers. See generally Anne L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of Tax-
Based Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L. REV. 533 (1995). On balance, however, the tax law treats capital
income more favorably than labor income. See John Buckley, Tax Changes Since Woodworth 's Time:
Implications for Future Tax Reform, 34 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1,7-8 (2008); Turier, supra, at 125.
4. See, e.g., Noel B. Cunningham & Deborah H. Schenk, The Case for a Capital Gains
Preference, 48 TAx L. REV. 319 (1993); Daniel Halperin, Commentary, A Capital Gains Preference is
not EVEN a Second-Best Solution, 48 TAX L. REV. 381 (1993); Daniel N. Shaviro, Commentary,
Uneasiness and Capital Gains, 48 TAX L. REV. 393 (1993).
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the debate.5 In recent years, however, concerns about rapidly growing
economic inequality have refocused attention on equity considerations and
raised serious questions about the validity of efficiency-based arguments
in favor of the capital income preference. Thomas Piketty's book, Capital
in the Twenty-First Century,6 is perhaps the most well-known work to
analyze the widening economic gulf between capital owners and workers,
and it has galvanized other scholars to address this urgent problem.7
Piketty's central thesis is that the return on capital tends to exceed
significantly the growth rate of the economy, which leads to increasing
concentrations of wealth in the hands of the few and extreme inequality.8
This Article undertakes an equity-based analysis of the tax law's
capital-labor distinction from a new perspective. It looks beyond explicit
tax preferences for income from capital such as the capital gains rate and
examines less transparent but equally significant ways in which the law
undertaxes capital owners and overtaxes workers, thereby contributing to
the growing inequality between capital owners and workers.
9
5. For example, Edward Kleinbard's proposal for a dual income tax system is based on the
premise that capital is more mobile than labor, and that it is therefore efficient to tax capital at lower
rates than labor. See Edward D. Kleinbard, An American Dual Income Tax: Nordic Precedents, 5 Nw.
J. L. & Soc. PoL'Y. 41, 45-47 (2010); see also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, And Yet It Moves: Taxation and
Labor Mobility in the Twenty-First Century, 67 TAx L. REV. 169 (2014).
More recently, much of the debate about capital income preferences has focused on whether a
consumption tax, which completely exempts capital from tax, would be superior to an income tax, a
question which is beyond the scope of this Article. See, e.g., Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Is
the Debate Between an Income Tax and a Consumption Tax a Debate About Risk? Does it Matter?, 47
TAX L. REV. 377 (1992); Joseph Bankman & David A. Weisbach, The Superiority of an Ideal
Consumption Tax over an Ideal Income Tax, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1413 (2006); Daniel Shaviro, Beyond
the Pro-Consumption Tax Consensus, 60 STAN. L. REV. 745 (2007); Chris William Sanchirico, A
Critical Look at the Economic Argument for Taxing Only Labor Income, 63 TAx L. REV. 867 (2010).
6. THOMAS PIKEIrY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2014).
7. See, e.g., Joseph Bankman & Daniel Shaviro, Piketty in America: A Tale of Two Literatures,
68 TAX L. REV. 453 (2015); Paul L. Caron, Thomas Piketty and Inequality: Legal Causes and Tax
Solutions, 64 EMORY L. J. ONLINE 2073 (2015); James M. Puckett, Wealth Inequality and Progressive
Taxation (Mar. 20, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); Nelson D. Schwartz,
Economists Take Aim at Inequality, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/201
6/01/04/business/economy/economists-take-aim-atwealthinequality.html.
8. See PIKETrY, supra note 6, at 26-27, 77.
9. The Article takes as its starting point the growing inequality between capital owners and
workers, but acknowledges that neither workers nor capital owners are a monolithic group. There are
wide variations within each as to their socioeconomic standing. Capital owners range from a person
with $200 in a savings account to Warren Buffett. Workers range from the low-wage and unskilled to
highly compensated executives. The Article focuses on inequality between capital owners and
workers, which Piketty estimates to account for about one-third of the increase in total income
inequality since 1980. See PIKETTY, supra note 6, at 300. The Article does not specifically address the
growing inequality among workers that is particularly pronounced in the United States. See id., at 298-
300, 315-21 (describing how the increase in inequality in the U.S. since the 1970 is due in large part to
wage inequality). However, the Article does have some bearing on wage inequality as well, to the
2017]
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
The Article begins with an exploration of intellectual capital, a growing
form of capital that includes not only legally protected intangible assets,
such as patents and copyrights, but also other sources of value such as
goodwill and organizational processes and know-how. The creation of
intellectual capital enables capital owners to "propertize" labor: through
the use of intellectual property laws, contract and employment laws, and
other legal and organizational mechanisms, capital owners are able to
capture the returns from their workers' economic productivity. The Article
discusses how the legal landscape is rapidly evolving to facilitate and
expand the propertization of labor.
The Article then turns to the ways in which the tax law subsidizes the
process of propertization. Specifically, the tax law allows capital owners
to immediately deduct most costs of creating intellectual capital, which
has the effect of exempting from tax their income from intellectual capital.
Furthermore, the tax law is overly generous to capital owners with respect
to their investments in human capital, while, at the same time, it denies
workers recognition of similar investments.10 In these ways, the tax
exacerbates the widening wealth and income gap between capital owners
and workers.
The Article concludes with reflections about the porous and changeable
boundary between labor and capital. It questions whether the tax law
distinction between labor income and capital income is useful or even
meaningful. The Article posits that the tax law should not treat labor
income and capital income as distinct categories, but rather, should
recognize that workers and capital owners contribute to and share in the
returns from their collaborative efforts. The Article concludes with an
overview of specific reform proposals that would implement this
reconceptualization of workers and capital owners.
extent that very highly compensated workers tend to receive a substantial portion of their pay in forms
that they are able to treat as capital gains. See infra Part 111.
10. Human capital is closely related to intellectual capital but not coterminous. Intellectual
capital focuses on businesses' investment in and production of intangible sources of future value,
which often require a high proportion of labor inputs. Human capital focuses on an individual's
capabilities to produce future value. Capital owners make human capital investments in their workers,
and workers also make human capital investments in themselves. See infra notes 136-139 and
accompanying text.
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I. INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL AND THE PROPERTIZATION OF LABOR
A. The Rise of Intellectual Capital
Capital encompasses forms of wealth including "land, buildings,
machinery, firms, stocks, bonds, patents, livestock, gold, natural resources,
etc."" The defimition includes physical capital, such as land, buildings,
and other material goods. 12 It also includes intangible assets such as
patents or copyrights and financial assets such as bank accounts, corporate
stock, and pension funds.'
3
The composition of capital has changed significantly over the last
several centuries. Agricultural land, which three centuries ago, accounted
for more than one-half of total capital, comprises only a minimal fraction
of total capital today, and has been supplanted by industrial and financial
capital.'
4
Of these new types of capital, financial capital, and in particular
corporate stock, is comprised of the underlying assets owned by
corporations. As Piketty observes, much of the value of corporate stock is
attributable to what he calls immaterial capital:
[M]any forms of immaterial capital are taken into account by way
of the stock market capitalization of corporations. For instance, the
stock market value of a company often depends on its reputation
and trademarks, its information systems and modes of organization,
its investments, whether material or immaterial, for the purpose of
making its products and services more visible and attractive ......
11. PIKETTY, supra note 6, at 113. Some commentators havc criticized Piketty's definition of
capital and his measurement of it. See, e.g., Matthew Rognlie, Deciphering the Fall and Rise in the Net
Capital Share (Brookings Papers on Econ. Activity, 2015), http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/
projects/bpea/spring-2015/2015arognlie.pdf (observing that most of the increasing returns to capital
are attributable to the housing sector and that, outside of that sector, the return to capital relative to
labor is not increasing, contrary to Piketty's assertion). Other commentators seem to think Piketty's
definition of capital is not particularly problematic. See, e.g., Robert M. Solow, Thomas Piketty Is
Right, NEW REPUBLIC (Apr. 22, 2014), https://newrepublic.com/article/l 17429/capital-twenty-first-
century-thomas-piketty-reviewed.
12. PIKETTY, supra note 6, at 49.
13. Id. at 48-49.
14. Id. at 42, 116 fig. 3.1, 117 fig. 3.2, 151. Housing continues to be substantial component of
today's capital. See id. at 116 fig 3.1, 117 fig 3.2, 151; ROBERT B. REICH, SAVING CAPITALISM 16-22
(2015) (describing the change in capital from agricultural land to industrial capital and intellectual
property).
15. PIKETTY, supra note 6, at 49.
2017]
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This Article uses the term "intellectual capital" to refer to these forms of
immaterial capital. Intellectual capital has been likened to dark matter-
the essential substance that binds together the universe but is not directly
observable. 16 It is broadly defined to be "nonphysical sources of value
(claims to future benefits) generated by innovation (discovery), unique
organizational designs, or human resource practices."' 7 Intellectual capital
includes not only separable, identifiable, and legally protected assets such
as patents, trademarks, and copyrights, but also less distinct assets such as
information systems, administrative structures and processes, market and
technical knowledge, brands, trade secrets, organizational know-how,
culture, strategic capabilities, and customer satisfaction. 18 Examples of this
broader definition of intellectual capital include Wal-Mart's computerized
supply chain, Amazon's customer service reputation, and Google's unique
business model. 19
16. See Ricardo Hausmann & Federico Sturzenegger, U.S. and Global Imbalances: Can Dark
Matter Prevent a Big Bang? (Nov. 13, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), www.cid.harvard.edu/
cidpublications/darkmatter 051130.pdf (theorizing that the omission of valuable assets such as know-
how, brand recognition, expertise, and research and development skews estimates of trade
imbalances). Despite the difficulty of precisely defining intellectual capital, the concept is easy to
grasp intuitively, and its many definitions share core similarities. In their survey of numerous
definitions of intellectual capital, Leandro Cafhibano, Manuel Garcia-Ayuso Covarsi, and M. Paloma
Sanchez find most definitions agree that intellectual capital refers to "sources of probable future
economic profits, lacking physical substance, which are controlled by a firm as a result of previous
events or transactions (self-production, purchase or any other means of acquisition)." LEANDRO
CAMIBANO, MANUEL GARCiA-AYUSO COVARSi & M. PALOMA SANCHEZ, THE VALUE RELEVANCE
AND MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS OF INTANGIBLES: A LITERATURE REVIEW 14 (1999),
http://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/1947974.pdf.
17. BARUCH LEV, INTANGIBLES: MANAGEMENT, MEASUREMENT, AND REPORTING 7 (2001). Lev
cites Merck's pharmaceutical advances as an example of discovery, Cisco's internet-based product
installation and maintenance system as an example of unique organizational design, and Xerox's
information-sharing system for employees as an example of human resources. Id. at 6. Lev notes that a
combination of these sources can produce intellectual capital: the valuable brand Coke combines
innovation (the secret Coke formula) and organizational structure (exceptional marketing savvy). See
id.
The concept of intellectual capital is not new. As early as the mid-nineteenth century, economists
recognized that value inheres in more than just tangible assets and that knowledge and innovation are
essential components of economic activity. See Mie Augier & David J. Teece, An Economics
Perspective on Intellectual Capital, in PERSPECTIVES ON INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL 3-4 (Bernard Marr
ed., 2005); Bernard Marr, The Evolution and Convergence of Intellectual Capital as a Theme, in
PERSPECTIVES ON INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL, supra, at 213-14; see also Peter Hill, Tangibles,
Intangibles and Services: A New Taxonomy for the Classification of Output, 32 CANADIAN J. ECON.
426, 428-37 (1999).
18. See Farok J. Contractor, Intangible Assets and Principles for Their Valuation, in VALUATION
OF INTANGIBLE ASSETS IN GLOBAL OPERATIONS 3, 7 fig. 1.1, 8 (Farok J. Contractor ed., 2001);
Juergen H. Daum, INTANGIBLE ASSETS AND VALUE CREATION 17 (2003); LEV, supra note 17, at 5-7.
19. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., NEW SOURCES OF GROWTH: KNOWLEDGE-
BASED CAPITAL-KEY ANALYSES AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS-SYNTHESIS REPORT 8, 17 (2013)
[hereinafter OECD REPORT], https://www.oecd.org/sti/inno/knowledge-based-capital-synthesis.pdf.
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The growing importance of intellectual capital is indisputable.
20
Companies such as Google, Amazon, and Apple exemplify the new
business model. Their most valuable assets are not property, plant, and
equipment, but rather operating systems, product designs, organizational
structures, and their reputation among customers.2' Intellectual capital is
also dominant in more traditional companies. For example, the physical
assets of Nestl6, the world's largest food company, comprise only thirteen
percent of its total value.22
The value of intellectual capital relative to total capital is difficult to
estimate, in part because its value can be inferred only indirectly from the
value of the corporations who own much of it, combined with the fact that
financial and national accounting systems have historically undervalued or
excluded intellectual capital from measures of economic productivity and
wealth.23 Economists estimate that official measures of gross domestic
product in recent years omitted as much as one trillion dollars per year of
investments in intellectual capital.24 As Calvin Johnson points out, Google
and Microsoft's self-created intangible assets are worth hundreds of
billions of dollars, as evidenced by their market capitalization, but their
balance sheets show none of these assets.25 Other scholars have observed a
similar anomaly with respect to pharmaceutical companies: their
investments in research and development are not recorded as assets on
their balance sheets, but their market capitalizations clearly demonstrate
the value of these assets.26
20. See generally id. (documenting the global increase in business investment in intellectual
capital and the resulting increasing productivity gains).
21. See id. at 8, 17. Intellectual capital is also dominant in more traditional companies. For
example, the physical assets of Nestle, the world's largest food company, comprise only 13% of its
total value. See id. at 9.
22. See id. at 9.
23. See Hill, supra note 17, at 436-37, 445; Leonard Nakamura, Intangibles: What Put the New
in the New Economy?, Bus. REV., July-Aug. 1999, at 3, 4, 6-10.
24. See Leonard Nakamura, Investing in Intangibles: Is a Trillion Dollars Missing from GDP?,
Bus. REV., Q4 2001, at 35-36; Carol Corrado, Charles Hulten, & Daniel Sichel, Measuring Capital
and Technology: An Expanded Framework, in MEASURING CAPITAL IN THE NEW ECONOMY 11, 12, 30
(Carol Corrado et al. eds., 2005) [hereinafter Corrado et al., Measuring Capital and Technology].
25. See Calvin H. Johnson, Organizational Capital: The Most Important Unsettling Issue in Tax,
148 TAx NOTES 667, 676 (2015).
26. These scholars cite the expensing of self-created R&D to explain why the earnings and assets
of companies, such as pharmaceutical manufacturers, seem very low relative to their stock prices. They
argue that the expensing of self-created R&D depresses the earnings of these companies and that the
failure to capitalize self-created R&D undervalues the assets of these companies. See Nakamura, supra
note 24, at 30-31; Charles Hulten, Accounting for the Knowledge Economy 7-10 (The Conference Bd.
Econ. Program Working Paper No. 08-13, 2008), http://www.conference-board.org/pdf free/
workingpapers/E-0040-08-WP.pdf, see also William Hubbard, The Debilitating Effect of Exclusive
2017]
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To remedy the failure of most accounting systems to measure
adequately intellectual capital, Carol Corrado, Charles Hulten, and Daniel
Sichel developed a framework for quantifying intellectual capital and its
impact on the national economy.27 Their model is the most theoretically
advanced and comprehensive to date, and according to the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), is widely
accepted.28 Based on this model, Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel found that,
in recent years, intellectual capital accounted for 27 percent of economic
growth, putting it on par with tangible capital in importance as a source of
growth.
29
In response to the work of economists such as Corrado, Hulten and
Sichel, government agencies and non-governmental organizations are
beginning to recognize more fully the role of intellectual capital in
economic activity. For example, in 2013, the U.S. Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA) for the first time included research and development
(R&D), as well as artistic creations such as films, music, and books, in its
measures of national economic productivity and wealth, which added $560
billion to the size of the U.S. economy.30 A 2013 report of the OECD
documented intellectual capital's ascendance to a global phenomenon and
urged policy reforms in taxation, innovation, entrepreneurship, education,
competition, corporate reporting, and intellectual property laws in order to
realize fully the potential gains of this key economic driver.31 The
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the International
Accounting Standards Board (AS) have acknowledged the need to require
additional qualitative and quantitative disclosure about self-created
intangible assets.32 In sum, intellectual capital is indubitably a major and
Rights: Patents and Productive Inefficiency, 66 FLA. L. REv. 2045, 2046-47 (2014) (discussing other
oddities in the pharmaceutical industry).
27. See Carol Corrado, Charles Hulten, & Daniel Sichel, Intangible Capital and U.S. Economic
Growth, 55 REV. INC. & WEALTH 661, 662, 682 (2009) [hereinafter Corrado et al., Intangible Capital];
Corrado et al., Measuring Capital and Technology, supra note 24, at I1, 12, 30.
28. See OECD REPORT, supra note 19, at 12.
29. See Corrado et al., Intangible Capital, supra note 27, at 680.
30. See Peter Coy, The Rise of the Intangible Economy: U.S. GDP Counts R&D, Artistic
Creation, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (July 18, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/
articles/20130718/the-rise-of-the-intangible-economy-u-dot-s-dot-gdp-counts-r-and-d-artistic-creation.
The BEA restated GDP for each year retroactive to 1929, the first year of measurement. Id. These
additions increased the size of the U.S. economy in 2013 by $560 billion, or 3.6 percent. See Jared
Bernstein & Dean Baker, Op-Ed., What is 'Seinfeld' Worth?, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/ 08/01/opinion/what-is-seinfeld-worth.html.
31. See OECD REPORT, supra note 19, at 6-11.
32. The FASB and ]AS considered a joint project to expand disclosure guidelines for intangibles,
as part of a broader and ongoing convergence project in 2002. See AM. INST. CERTIFIED PUB.
ACCOUNTANTS, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REPORTING STANDARDS 5-6 (2011),
[VOL. 94:607
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increasing driver of economic productivity, and its ascendance marks a
substantial change in the nature and composition of capital.
B. The Centrality of Labor in Intellectual Capital
Capital almost always requires labor to be created or enhanced.33 This
is true of traditional forms of capital, such as agriculture and other real
estate.34 Owners of farmland, for example, require workers to cultivate and
harvest crops and raise livestock in order for the farmland to be
productive.35 Owners of other real estate need workers to build and
maintain the structures from which owners derive income and gain.
36
Capital in the form of natural resources, such as gold or oil, requires
workers to extract and process them into marketable forms.37 Industrial
capital, such as, for example, a widget factory, needs workers to run,
operate, and maintain the machinery that produces the widgets. 38 The
widget producer also needs workers to develop advertising and marketing
plans for the widgets.39
Although labor is always integral to the productive use of capital,
intellectual capital is particularly labor-intensive and often requires
workers' knowledge, experience, and skills. 40 For example, strategic
planning requires primarily the time and effort of managers.41 Likewise,
the creation of a consumer products brand results primarily from the work
effort of design and marketing personnel.42 Similarly, scientific R&D
http://www.ifrs.com/pdf/1FRSUpdate V8.pdf. Due to resource constraints, they decided not to move
forward with it. See Action Alert No. 07-52, FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD. (Dec. 28, 2007),
http://www.fasb.org/ action/aal22807.shtml. However, more recently, the financial accounting
community has shown a renewed interest in reforming financial reporting for intangibles. See Emily
Chasan, FASB's Future Priorities Start to Take Shape, WALL ST. J.: CFO J. (Sept. 17, 2013, 1:00
PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/ cfo/2013/09/17/fasbs-future-priorities-start-to-take-shape/ (noting that
accounting for intangible assets is among the top reform priorities).
33. See generally PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS (19t" ed.) 233-
34 (stating that production is a team effort and that the factors of production, land, labor and capital,
are interdependent).
34. See id.at 267-68.
35. See id.at 268.
36. See id.at 283.
37. See id.at 268.
38. Seeid.at 283.
39. See id.
40. For this reason, some scholars refer to it as knowledge-based capital. See, e.g., OECD
REPORT, supra note 19; KARL ERIK SVEIBY, THE NEW ORGANIZATIONAL WEALTH: MANAGING AND
MEASURING KNOWLEDGE-BASED ASSETS (1997).
41. See Corrado et al., Intangible Capital, supra note 27, at 670; Corrado et al., Measuring
Capital and Technology, supra note 24, at 29.
42. See Corrado et al., Measuring Capital and Technology, supra note 24, at 28.
2017]
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requires primarily the time and effort of scientists, although it also requires
expenditures for labs and equipment. 43 Not all labor expenditures produce
intellectual capital.44  For example, a fast food server or an office
receptionist serves the current needs of his or her employer, but the
services arguably do not provide significant long-term benefits to the
employer. On the other hand, even these services arguably contribute to
the creation of a business' customer service reputation and goodwill.45
With respect to legally distinct assets such as patents or copyrights, the
contribution of labor to the creation of intellectual capital becomes
embedded in the asset, in what Rob Merges calls the "propertization of
labor. ' '46 Legally enforceable patent or copyright protections enable the
owner of the asset (that is, the capital owner) to appropriate and control the
knowledge contributions of workers.47
Other types of intellectual capital are not distinct, legally protected
assets. However, businesses often rely upon mechanisms other than
intellectual property laws to capture and control the labor of their workers.
Many of these are legal in nature, such as covenants not to compete,
nondisclosure agreements, and trade secrets laws.48 Covenants not to
compete prohibit workers from employing their training, skill and
43. See id. at 26-27.
44. Corrado, Hulten and Sichel estimate, for example, that about sixty percent of advertising
expenditures produce ads with long-lasting value, as compared to "this week's sale"-type ads. See
Corrado et al., Intangible Capital, supra note 27, at 670.
45. Chris William Sanchirico, Taxing Carried Interest: The Problematic Analogy to 'Sweat
Equity', 117 TAX NOTES 239, 242 (2007) [hereinafter Sanchirico, Taxing Carried Interest].
46. ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 197 (2011); Robert P. Merges,
Intellectual Property and the Costs of Commercial Exchange: A Review Essay, 93 MICH. L. REV.
1570, 1575 (1995).
47. See Catherine L. Fisk, Working Knowledge: Trade Secrets, Restrictive Covenants in
Employment, and the Rise of Corporate Intellectual Property, 1800-1920, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 441,
445-46 (2001); Erica Gorga & Michael Halberstam, Knowledge Inputs, Legal Institutions and Firm
Structure: Towards a Knowledge-Based Theory of the Firm, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 1123, 1149 (2007);
see also Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, Law and the Boundaries of Technology-Intensive
Firms, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1649, 1671-88 (2009) (discussing the organizational effects of patent,
copyright, trade secret and other legal protections for innovation and information); see generally Dan
L. Burk & Brett H. McDonnell, The Goldilocks Hypothesis: Balancing Intellectual Property Rights at
the Boundary of the Firm, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 575 (2007) (analyzing how the strength of intellectual
property protections affects inter- and intra-firm transactions costs).
48. See ORLY LOBEL, TALENT WANTS TO BE FREE 49-75; 98-120 (2013); Orly Lobel, The New
Cognitive Property: Human Capital Law and the Reach of Intellectual Property, 93 TEx. L. REV. 789,
790-91 (2015); Gorga & Halberstam, supra note 47, at 1159-63. In addition to legal mechanisms,
businesses also use "organizational strategies," as Erica Gorga and Michael Halberstam call them, to
control knowledge and information. Id. at 1127. For example, a business might restrict critical
knowledge to a small number of insiders or isolate the business geographically. Id. at 1158-59.
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experience elsewhere.49 Nonsolicitation, nondealing, and nonpoaching
prohibit an employee, after leaving a company, from soliciting or dealing
with the company's clients or customers or from hiring former co-
workers. 50 Nondisclosure agreements and trade secret laws enable business
owners to protect valuable organizational capital-for example,
information relating to suppliers and customers, organizational routines
and business practices, decision-making processes, quality control
procedures, coordination and division work.51
In recent decades, there has been a significant expansion of business
owners' ability to capture and control workers' contributions to the
creation and enhancement of intellectual capital.52 This is true for more
traditional forms of intellectual property such as patents and copyrights.
Oren Bar-Gill and Gideon Parchomovsky describe the trend with respect
to patent law:
This trend manifested itself in various aspects of patent law,
including the broadening of the definition of patentable subject
matter to include, among others, business-method patents, the
encouraging of government-subsidized bodies (such as universities)
to claim patent protection, and the increasing tendency of the legal
system to uphold patents. As part of this trend, patent law has
expanded to tolerate even merely embryonic innovation .... Patent
law provides an impressive array of remedies to successful
plaintiffs, including injunctive relief, actual damages, treble
49. See Gorga & Halberstam, supra note 47, 1143 tbl. A, 1162 tbl. B; Katherine V.W. Stone,
Knowledge at Work: Disputes over the Ownership of Human Capital in the Changing Workplace, 34
CONN. L. REV. 721, 738 (2002).
50. See Lobel, supra note 48, at 828-31.
51. See Gorga & Halberstam, supra note 47, 1143 tbl. A, 1162 tbl. B; Stone, supra note 49, at
738. Other legal controls based on breach of duty of loyalty and industrial espionage claims also
restrain workers from using knowledge or information to benefit a competitor. See Stone, supra note
49, at 738.
52. See Lobel, supra note 48, at 790-91. Intellectual property laws have experienced several
periods of growth and expansion in the United States. Catherine Fisk, in her analysis of the
development of the intellectual property laws and the laws governing restrictive covenants from 1800
to 1920, documents the "gradual shift to recognizing knowledge, especially inchoate knowledge, as a
form of property, and then recognizing that property as belonging to someone other than the employee
who possessed it." See Fisk, supra note 47, at 446. Fisk describes the legal developments during this
period as reflecting "the growing conflict between the free labor ideology and the demands of
industrialization which increasingly called for the corporate control of every tangible and intangible
product of work" which "witnessed in its last days unprecedented formalization of corporate power
over all aspects of employment and production." Id. at 535. See generally William W. Fischer, Ill, The
Growth of Intellectual Property: A History of the Ownership of Ideas in the United States, in
EIGENTUM IM INTERNATIONALEN VERGLEICH 265-91 (1999), reprinted in I INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS 72-94 (David Vaver ed., 2006).
2017]
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
damages for willful infringement, and attorneys' fees in exceptional
cases.
53
In the area of copyright law, Lawrence Lessig describes an even more
dramatic expansion of business owners' ability to capture the returns from
intellectual property:
So copyright's duration has increased dramatically-tripled in the
past thirty years. And copyright's scope has increased as well-
from regulating only publishers to now regulating just about
everyone. And copyright's reach has changed, as every action
becomes a copy and hence presumptively regulated. And as
technologists find better ways to control the use of content, and as
copyright is increasingly enforced through technology, copyright's
force changes, too. Misuse is easier to find and easier to control.54
Furthermore, under the work for hire doctrine, an employer is presumed to
be the author and owner of works created by an employee unless the
parties agree otherwise.55
The trend toward expansion of business owners' intellectual property
rights is equally pronounced with respect to employment law restrictions
on workers.56 The use of covenants not to compete and nondisclosure
agreements has become widespread. 57 Courts have expanded the power
and scope of these restrictive covenants by liberalizing what constitutes
reasonable temporal and geographic constraints, more freely upholding
53. Bar-Gill & Parchomovsky, supra note 47, at 1672-73 (footnotes omitted). They note that the
trend may be reversing somewhat in recent years on the basis of recent judicial decisions raising the
bar of patentability and narrowing the scope of protection. See id. at 1673-75.
54. LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 161-62 (2004).
55. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Creative Employee and the Copyright Act of1976, 54 U.
CH i. L. REV. 590, 598-99 (1987).
56. See Lobel, supra note 48, at 793-833 (describing the expansion of regulatory and contractual
controls on human capital, including noncompetition contracts, pre-invention assignment agreements,
nonsolicitation, nonpoaching, and antidealing agreements, nondisclosure agreements, and trade secret
laws); Stone, supra note 49, at 737-62 (describing doctrinal expansions in the ability of employers to
restrain former employees from using knowledge obtained at their firms).
57. See Stone, supra note 49, at 738-39; Sampsa Samila & Olav Sorenson, Noncompete
Covenants: Incentives to Innovate or Impediments to Growth, 57 MGMT. SCI. 425, 425 (2011); Mark J.
Garmaise, Ties that Truly Bind: Noncompetition Agreements, Executive Compensation, and Firm
Investment, 27 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 376, 378, 396 (2011) (finding that in a randomly selected sample of
500 Execucomp firms, 70.2 percent report using noncompetition agreements with top executives,
although the actual percentage is likely higher); Norman D. Bishara, Kenneth J. Martin, & Randall S.
Thomas, An Empirical Analysis of Noncompetition Clauses and Other Restrictive Postemployment
Covenants, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1, 24, 28 tbl. 2 (2015) (finding that in a randomly selected sample of
500 S&P 1500 public companies, 82.3 percent of CEO contracts contained restrictive covenants during
the period 2001-2010).
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them in the at-will context, and either revising or partially enforcing
invalid covenants. 58 In addition, courts have expanded the type of interest
that is considered protectable by a restrictive covenant to include customer
lists and knowledge obtained by employer-provided training.
59
The law of trade secrets has also expanded significantly in recent years
to empower business owners to control workers. 60 The definition of trade
secret has expanded dramatically to extend trade secret protection beyond
the technical realm to all commercially valuable information. 61 It has
become standard practice for employment contracts to include expansive
lists of confidential information beyond the statutory definition of trade
secret.62 In addition, even in the absence of a protectable trade secret or a
restrictive covenant, business owners have the power to restrict workers'
use of knowledge under the expanding doctrine of inevitable disclosure,
which enables a business owner to enjoin a former employee from
working for a competitor on the grounds that such work would inevitably
63
require the disclosure of trade secrets. Furthermore, trade secret law has
become increasingly criminalized under the Economic Espionage Act and
the National Stolen Property Act.64
58. See Stone, supra note 49, at 744. See generally Norman D. Bishara, Fifty Ways to Leave Your
Employer: Relative Enforcement of Covenants Not to Compete, Trends, and Implications for Employee
Mobility Policy, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 751, 780 (2011) (analyzing the changes in the strength of
enforceability of covenants not to compete in all states and finding "a measurable drift of the aggregate
policies in the United States toward greater enforcement"); Michael J. Garrison & John T. Wendt, The
Evolving Law of Employee Noncompete Agreements. Recent Trends and an Alternative Policy
Approach, 45 AM. Bus. L.J. 107, 122-48 (2008) (analyzing enforcement of covenants not to compete
and finding a general trend in the common law and legislation toward greater restrictions on
employees).
59. See Stone, supra note 49, at 746-56.
60. See Lobel, supra note 48, at 803-12.
61. See Stone, supra note 49, at 757; see also Bar-Gill & Parchomovsky, supra note 47, at
1675--78.
62. See Lobel, supra note 48, at 810.
63. See Stone, supra note 49, at 757-58. See generally David Lincicum, Inevitable Conflict?:
California 's Policy of Worker Mobility and the Doctrine of "Inevitable Disclosure," 75 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1257 (2002); Joseph F. Phillips, Inevitable Disclosure Through an Internet Lens: Is the
Doctrine's Demise Truly Inevitable?, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 395 (2003); Jennifer L. Saulino,
Locating Inevitable Disclosure's Place in Trade Secret Analysis, 100 MiCH. L. REV. 1184 (2002);
Brandy L. Treadway, An Overview of Individual States' Application of Inevitable Disclosure:
Concrete Doctrine or Equitable Tool?, 55 SMU L. REV. 621 (2002).
64. See Lobel, supra note 48, at 804-12 (describing the prosecution and conviction of computer
programmer Sergey Aleynikov for stealing source code and computer code from Goldman Sachs). In
2016, Congress further expanded federal trade secret laws with the enactment of the Defend Trade
Secrets Act of 2016. Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376 (2016).
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To summarize, on numerous fronts, the law has expanded in scope and
strength to increase the ability of capital owners to propertize labor into
intellectual capital.65
C. Who Gains from Propertization?
The enhanced ability of capital owners to propertize labor into
intellectual capital through the legal mechanisms described above does not
necessarily mean that they have also increased their share of the returns
from that intellectual capital. It may be that workers are able to extract
higher compensation in exchange for transferring their expertise for the
exclusive benefit of their employer. Most intellectual property and
corporate law scholars do not address the issue of how returns from
intellectual capital are shared between capital owners and workers.
Instead, they analyze intellectual property laws and employment
restrictions through an efficiency lens that seeks to allocate rights so as to
optimize overall productivity and maximize positive externalities, such as
knowledge spillovers and information flows that fuel innovation and
entrepreneurial growth.6 6 Dan Burk and Brett McDonnell allude to the
possibility that workers get the short end of the stick in their analysis of
intellectual property rights: "[I]t is even possible that the law rather
pervasively and systematically provides too little protection for employees
vis-A-vis firms. . . . [T]his leaves employees open to exploitation. ' 67
Unfortunately, they leave exploration of this possibility to future
research.68
The tenor of employment law scholars such as Kathy Stone and
Catherine Fisk suggests they, too, believe workers are on the losing end of
65. There are exceptions to this expansionary trend. For example, in patent law, recent judicial
decisions have raised the bar of patentability and narrowed the scope of protection. See Bar-Gill &
Parchomovsky, supra note 47, at 1673-75.
66. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts:
Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not To Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 575 (1999)
(hypothesizing that Silicon Valley companies benefit from knowledge spillovers that occur in the
absence of covenants not to compete); Lobel, supra note 48, at 350 ("[E]xcessive controls over
mobility and inventiveness are harmful to careers, regions, and innovation.... [I]t stymies the entry of
new competitors into the market and suppresses the spirit of entrepreneurship, which is vital to any
economy."); Norman D. Bishara, Covenants Not to Compete in a Knowledge Economy: Balancing
Innovation from Employee Mobility Against Legal Protection for Human Capital Investment, 27
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 287, 303-11 (2006) (describing the law and economics approach of
many scholars in analyzing restrictive covenants).
67. Burk & McDonnell, supra note 47, at 634-35.
68. See id. at 634.
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the bargain. 69 However, they tend to express their normative evaluations in
terms of workers' right to be free of unfair employer constraints on their
ability to work and do not address explicitly how these constraints affect
the distribution of economic returns between workers and capital owners.7°
Norman Bishara notes the dearth of research "focused on the normative
arguments about the propriety of noncompetes when it comes to workers'
rights and issues such as bargaining power asymmetries. 71
Whether workers receive higher pay in exchange for agreeing to
employer restrictions is a question that needs much additional research.
However, one scholar, Mark Garmaise, finds the opposite to be true-
employees are actually paid less when they are subject to employer
restrictions. 72 Garmaise analyzes the effects of noncompete covenants on
executive employment based on state-by-state variances in the strength of
enforcement, and finds that stronger enforcement of noncompete
covenants results in lower executive compensation.
7 3
69. Stone argues that courts should interpret restrictions on employees narrowly because the
implicit psychological contract between business owners and workers has changed from a long-term
relationship, in which a business owner "gave the worker an implicit promise of lifetime job security
and opportunities for promotion along clearly-defined job ladders," to a temporary, contingent
relationship "with no set path, no established expectations, and no tacit promises of job security.
Employees are expected to chart their own path, face their own fortunes, and manage their own careers
in a boundaryless workplace." Stone, supra note 49, at 725, 732.
Fisk argues that "[b]y transforming employee knowledge into corporate property, law has
consecrated a power relationship and has justified rights to control employee mobility in significant
ways." See Catherine L. Fisk, Knowledge Work. New Metaphors for the New Economy, 80 CHi.-KENT
L. REv. 839, 856 (2005).
70. See, e.g., Fisk, supra note 47, at 535 (stating that the nineteenth century development of trade
secrets and restrictive covenants "reflected the growing conflict between the free labor ideology and
the demands of industrialization which increasingly called for the corporate control of every tangible
and intangible product of work"); Stone, supra note 49, at 763 (arguing that courts should narrowly
construe trade secrets law and restrictive covenants and "thereby give employees broad rights to
acquire, retain, and deploy their human capital"); see also Bishara, supra note 66, at 311-12
(describing an employees' right approach to analyzing restrictive covenants, which "emphasizes the
sovereignty of the employee and challenges the firm's ability to control the individual's labor post-
employment"); see also Stefan Loicking & Susanne Pernicka, Knowledge Work and Intellectual
Property Rights: New Challenges for Trade Unions, 14 J. WORKPLACE RTS. 311, 316 (2009) (noting
that intellectual property rights affect "the balance of power between knowledge workers and their
employers;" also noting parallels to Marx's theory of primitive accumulation: "the double process of
transforming public goods . . . into private property and expropriating workers from their means of
production).
71. Bishara, supra note 58, at 762 n.40.
72. Garmaise, supra note 57, at 413 (finding that increased enforcement of noncompetes leads to
lower executive compensation).
73. See id. at 401-A2. This finding seems somewhat counterintuitive, but the explanation appears
to be as follows: executives in states where noncompete covenants are strongly enforced initially
bargain for higher compensation, perhaps in the form of a signing bonus, but once they are locked into
a firm, their pay increases diminish over time relative to pay increases for executives in states without
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Garmaise also considers the effect of noncompete covenants on
employers' human capital investments-for instance, employee training or
the revelation of trade secrets-and employees' investments in their own
human capital-for example, networking with managers at other firms or
taking on leadership positions in industry associations.74 He finds that
noncompete covenants tend to encourage firm investments in managerial
human capital and discourage individuals' investments in their own human
capital.75
What little evidence there is at this point suggests that workers lose out
when their labor is propertized into intellectual capital. It is also
reasonable to surmise that business owners benefit from this
propertization. On the other hand, it is possible that business owners end
up no better off, or actually end up worse off, because, for example, their
workers perform less well when their mobility is restricted,76 or because
they lose out on the benefits of information spillovers.77 But whether, as a
result of propertization, the pie is bigger, smaller, or the same size, it
seems likely that business owners end up with a bigger piece relative to
the workers.
II. TAX SUBSIDIES OF PROPERTIZATION
The rise of a new form of capital-intellectual capital-illustrates how
labor contributes to the creation or enhancement of capital and becomes
embedded in capital. The conversion of labor into intellectual capital-its
strong enforcement of noncompete covenants. Over time, it appears that pay in the low-enforcement
states outstrips pay in the high-enforcement states. See id.
In addition, Garmaise finds that strong enforcement of noncompete covenants also leads to more
salary-based, as opposed to incentive-based, compensation and lower pay increases for executives who
change jobs. See id. at 402-07. He also finds that strong enforcement leads to longer job tenure and
reduced mobility. See id. at 400, 413.
74. See id. at 382-83.
75. See id. at 413-14; On Amir & Orly Lobel, Driving Performance: A Growth Theory of
Noncompete Law, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 833, 846 (2013) (observing that covenants not to compete
cause employees to perform less well and invest less in their own human capital).
76. See Amir & Lobel, supra note 75, at 863 (finding that individuals' quality of work declined
when they were subject to restrictions their mobility).
77. See Garmaise, supra note 57, at 411-12 (finding that enforcement of covenants to compete
has no significant effect on firm value or profitability and theorizing that "the positive spillovers from
low enforceability may roughly balance out the disadvantages at the individual firm level"); Samila &
Sorenson, supra note 57, at 436 (finding that noncompete covenants limit entrepreneurship and impede
innovation); Kenneth A. Younge, Employee Mobility and the Appropriation of Value from
Knowledge: Evidence from Three Essays 8 (2012) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Colorado), http://gradworks.umi.com/35/27/3527377.html (finding that constraints on employee
mobility initially boost firm value but that the effect is eventually undone because firms are harmed by
the slower circulation of talent and ideas).
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propertization-enables capital owners to capture a greater share of the
economic gains derived from the combined efforts of labor and capital.
This section shows how the tax law subsidizes propertization and thereby
magnifies the distributional effects of propertization as between capital
owners and workers.
A. Deductions for Intellectual Capital
Capital owners have two ways to acquire ownership of intellectual
capital. First, they can acquire it from third parties by purchasing a specific
asset such as a patent or by purchasing an ongoing business, thereby
acquiring intellectual capital such as good will, workforce in place, and
other types of organizational capital. The second way that capital owners
acquire intellectual capital is to create it themselves. Self-created
intellectual capital entails a variety of expenditures including computer
software development; scientific R&D; nonscientific R&D such as
development and design of products by the publishing, entertainment, and
financial services industries; advertising and market research used to
develop and maintain brands; workforce training and education; and
organizational strategic planning.
78
78. This list of intellectual capital expenditures is based on Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel's
taxonomy of the various types of investments in intellectual capital. They identify three major areas of
business investment in intellectual capital: (1) computerized information software, (2) innovative
property (scientific and nonscientific research and development), and (3) economic competencies
(brand-related investment such as advertising and organizational investments such as training and
strategic planning). See Corrado et al., Intangible Capital, supra note 27, at 669-70; Corrado et al.,
Measuring Capital and Technology, supra note 24, at 22-29.
Of particular note is the expansive R&D category, which includes nonscientific R&D-the
development and design of products by the publishing, entertainment, and financial services
industries-as well as scientific R&D, which includes work in the physical sciences, the biological
sciences, and mineral exploration. See Corrado et al., Intangible Capital, supra note 27, at 670, 674;
Corrado et al., Measuring Capital and Technology, supra note 24, at 24-28. Corrado, Hulten, and
Sichel estimate that by the late 1990s, nonscientific R&D was at least as large as traditional scientific
research. See Corrado et al., Intangible Capital, supra note 27, at 670; Corrado et al., Measuring
Capital and Technology, supra note 24, at 26.
Also noteworthy is their expansive economic competencies category, which includes advertising
and market research used to develop and maintain brands, costs of developing and launching new
products and developing customer lists, workforce training and education, and organizational change
and development. See Corrado et al., Measuring Capital and Technology, supra note 24, at 28-29; see
also Corrado et al., Intangible Capital, supra note 27, at 670. They estimate that from 2000 to 2003,
the most recent period for which they have data, total investment in economic competencies was
nearly as large as the other two major categories combined. See Corrado et al., Intangible Capital,
supra note 27, at 670.
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Under the principle of capitalization, the foundational importance of
which the Supreme Court has affirmed in its jurisprudence,7 9 capital
owners ought to capitalize expenditures they incur to acquire or create
intellectual capital. As the following discussion indicates, the treatment of
intellectual capital acquired from third parties is consistent with this
principle: capital owners must capitalize the acquisition costs. In contrast,
the treatment of self-created intellectual capital contravenes the
capitalization principle: capital owners can deduct almost all costs of self-
created intellectual capital.80
79. See INDOPCO, Inc. v. Comm'r, 503 U.S. 79 (1992); Comm'r v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S.
1 (1974). See also infra notes 82-98 and accompanying text.
80. See generally Lily Kahng, The Taxation of Intellectual Capital, 66 FLA. L. REV. 2229 (2014).
Several tax scholars have analyzed and critiqued the taxation of intangibles, most notably Calvin
Johnson. See Calvin H. Johnson, First Do No Harm: The Senate Staff Discussion Draft on Cost
Recovery, 142 TAX NOTES 549 (2014) [hereinafter Johnson, First Do No Harm], http://www.ssm.coml
abstract-2394912; Calvin H. Johnson, Extend the Tax Life for Acquired Intangibles to 75 Years, 135
TAX NOTES 1053, 1053-56 (2012), http://www.ssm.com/abstract- 2070101; Calvin H. Johnson,
Accurate and Honest Tax Accounting for Oil and Gas, 125 TAX NOTES 573 (2009),
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract-1503574 (discussing the taxation of intangible drilling costs); Calvin H.
Johnson, Capitalize Costs of Software Development, 124 TAX NOTES 603 (2009),
http://www.ssm.com/ abstract 1516809; Calvin H. Johnson, The Effective Tax Ratio and the
Undertaxation of Intangibles, 121 TAX NOTES 1289 (2008) [hereinafter Johnson, Undertaxation of
Intangibles], http://www.ssm.com/ abstract- 1315477; Calvin H. Johnson, Destroying Tax Base: The
Proposed INDOPCO Capitalization Regulations, 99 TAX NOTES 1381 (2003) [hereinafter Johnson,
Destroying Tax Base], http://www.ssrn.com/ abstract-412728; Calvin H. Johnson, Capitalization After
the Government's Big Win in INDOPCO, 63 TAX NOTES 1323 (1994) [hereinafter Johnson, Big Win],
https://law.utexas.edu/faculty/calvinjohnson/capitalization after the govemments bigwin.pdf; Calvin
H. Johnson, The Expenditures Incurred by the Target Corporation in an Acquisitive Reorganization
Are Dividends to the Shareholders: (Pssst, Don't Tell the Supreme Court), 53 TAX NOTES 463, 478
(1991) [hereinafter Johnson, Dividends], https://law.utexas.edu/faculty/calvinjohnson/expenditures
incurred by the target corp_10 28 91.pdf; see also Don Fullerton & Andrew B. Lyon, Tax
Neutrality and Intangible Capital, in 2 TAX POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 63 (Lawrence H. Summers
ed., 1988); Jane G. Gravelle & Jack Taylor, Tax Neutrality and the Tax Treatment of Purchased
Intangibles, 45 NAT'L TAX J. 77 (1992); John W. Lee, Transaction Costs Relating to Acquisition or
Enhancement of Intangible Property: A Populist, Political, but Practical Perspective, 22 VA. TAX
REV. 273, 276-77, 311-20 (2002) [hereinafter Lee, Transaction Costs]; John Lee et al., Restating
Capitalization Standards and Rules: The Case for "Rough Justice" Regulations (Part One), 23 OHIO
N.U. L. REV. 631 (1997) [hereinafter Lee et al., Rough Justice (Part One)]; John Lee et al., Restating
Capitalization Standards and Rules: The Case for "Rough Justice" Regulations (Part Two), 23 OHIO
N.U. L. REV. 1483 (1997) [hereinafter Lee et al., Rough Justice (Part Two)]; George Mundstock,
Taxation of Business Intangible Capital, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1179 (1987); Xuan-Thao Nguyen &
Jeffrey A. Maine, Equity and Efficiency in Intellectual Property Taxation, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1
(2010); David A. Weisbach, Measurement and Tax Depreciation Policy: The Case of Short-Term
Intangibles, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 199 (2004); Ethan Yale, The Final INDOPCO Regulations, 105 TAX
NOTES 435 (2004) [hereinafter Yale, INDOPCO Regulations]; Ethan Yale, When Are Capitalization
Exceptions Justified?, 57 TAX L. REV. 549 (2004) [hereinafter Yale, Capitalization Exceptions];
Timothy E. Johns, Note, Tax Treatment of the Costs of Internally Developed Intangible Assets, 57 S.
CAL. L. REV. 767 (1984); Glenn Walberg, Note, Everything Old Is New Again: Reaching the Limits of
INDOPCO 's Future Benefits with the Just-in-Time Management Philosophy, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1257 (1997).
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1. In Principle. The "Norm of Capitalization "81
Tax law generally provides for the deduction or capitalization of
business expenditures. I.R.C. § 162 allows businesses to deduct "all the
ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year
in carrying on any trade or business."8 2  I.R.C. § 263 provides that
businesses cannot deduct capital expenditures--"amount[s] paid out for
new buildings or for permanent improvements or betterments made to
increase the value of any property or estate."
' 83
As the Supreme Court explained in INDOPCO v. Commissioner,
capitalization "endeavors to match expenses with the revenues of the
taxable period to which they are properly attributable, thereby resulting in
a more accurate calculation of net income for tax purposes. 84 The idea
that businesses should capitalize expenditures that produce future benefits
is integral to the concept of income, 85  and tax law has required
capitalization since its inception.86
The Court has interpreted the capitalization requirement of I.R.C. § 263
expansively, stating that "deductions are exceptions to the norm of
capitalization, 87 and are guided by the principle that "a taxpayer's
realization of benefits beyond the year in which the expenditure is incurred
is undeniably important in determining whether the appropriate tax
treatment is immediate deduction or capitalization.
'
"
88
81. INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 84.
82. I.R.C. § 162(a) (2012).
83. I.R.C. § 263(a)(1).
84. INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 84.
85. As Calvin Johnson states:
A strong law of capitalization is extraordinarily important to an income tax. Under the norms
of an income tax, costs that constitute investments, generating future income for the taxpayer,
are capitalized and may not be deducted so long as the costs continue to generate
income.... The thesis that expensing an investment, that is, deducting it immediately, is
equivalent to exempting the subsequent income from the investment from tax, is one of the
bulwarks of modem tax economics, but it is not generally known or appreciated within the tax
law community.
Johnson, Dividends, supra note 80, at 478. For a comprehensive overview of capitalization in general,
see Lee et al., Rough Justice (Part One), supra note 80; see also Lee et al., Rough Justice (Part Two),
supra note 80.
86. Woodward v. Comm'r, 397 U.S. 572, 574-75 (1970).
87. INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 84.
88. Id. at 87. See generally Lee, Transaction Costs, supra note 80, at 311-19 (analyzing Supreme
Court capitalization jurisprudence). As an example of the Court's expansive interpretation of the
capitalization principle, it has in several cases required capitalization of expenses such as legal fees
that might be viewed as quintessentially deductible expenses. See, e.g., INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 88-90
(holding that investment banking, legal, and accounting fees paid in connection with the taxpayer's
being acquired by another company were capital; creation or enhancement of a separate and distinct
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With respect to tangible property, the Court's expansive view of
capitalization reached its zenith in Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co.,89
where the Court held that depreciation allowances for equipment used to
construct new facilities were not deductible, but rather must be
capitalized-that is, added to the basis of the new facilities. 90 Congress
subsequently enacted I.R.C. § 263A, a far-reaching extension of Idaho
Power that requires businesses to capitalize the direct and indirect costs of
constructing or producing tangible property.91
With respect to intangible property (which the tax law defines in a
manner similar to intellectual capital as defined in this Article), the Court,
in INDOPCO, further expanded its sweeping capitalization principle. In
INDOPCO, the taxpayer, the National Starch Corporation, paid investment
banking, legal, and accounting fees in connection with a merger in which
Unilever acquired the stock of National Starch.92 National Starch claimed
the majority of these expenses as deductions under I.R.C. § 162; the
government argued that the expenses were capital in nature. 93
Rejecting the taxpayer's argument that a capital expenditure must
relate to the acquisition or enhancement of a "separate and distinct asset,"
the Court found that National Starch's expenses were capital, even though
National Starch was the target of a takeover by Unilever, and, therefore,
had not acquired anything. 94 The Court reasoned that by becoming a
subsidiary of Unilever, National Starch would realize long-term benefits in
the form of synergies with Unilever product lines and customer bases,
access to Unilever's R&D resources, and the elimination of separate
asset was not necessary); Comm'r v. Lincoln Say. & Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345, 347-49, 354 (1971)
(concluding that mandatory premium payments made by bank to Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation were capital, and created or enhanced a "separate and distinct additional asset" (i.e., rights
in a secondary reserve fund), and were therefore, not ordinary); Woodward, 397 U.S. at 573-74, 579
(holding that legal, accounting, and appraisal expenses incurred in acquiring minority stock interest
were capital); United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 397 U.S. 580, 582-83, 585 (1970) (holding that
legal, consulting, and other fees paid by acquiring firm in connection with minority appraisal rights
were capital).
89. 418 U.S. 1 (1974).
90. See id. at 19.
91. See 1.R.C. § 263A (2012); see also Treas. Reg. §§ 1.263(a)-I (a)-6 (2013). Due to a
definitional divergence between "intangibles" and "intellectual capital" for tax purposes, certain types
of intellectual capital are also subject to § 263A of the Internal Revenue Code. See infra notes 101-
102, 109 and accompanying text.
92. INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 80-82.
93. See id. at 82.
94. See id. at 85-87 (internal quotations omitted). National Starch was the target of the
acquisition and therefore did not itself acquire any asset. See id. at 80. The taxpayer's argument was
based on the Court's prior decision in Comm "r v. Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass 'n. See id. at 86.
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reporting requirements and governance procedures.95 In light of these
long-term benefits, the Court held that National Starch's expenditures to
facilitate the acquisition were capital.96
INDOPCO established a strong capitalization principle for
expenditures related to a broad conception of intellectual capital including
brand and customer enhancement, research capabilities, and corporate
organization. 97 Indeed, in the aftermath of INDOPCO, many scholars and
practitioners speculated that INDOPCO would vastly expand the
capitalization requirement. 98 However, as discussed in the next Section,
the speculation proved unfounded. On the contrary, the capitalization
requirement has been nearly eliminated for self-created intellectual capital.
2. In Practice.: "Deductibility as the Default Rule "99
As discussed above, the Supreme Court in INDOPCO articulated a
sweeping capitalization principle which requires most expenditures related
to intellectual capital to be capitalized rather than immediately deducted.
Consistent with INDOPCO, current law generally requires capitalization
with respect to acquired intellectual capital. However, the current law's
treatment of self-created intellectual capital defies INDOPCO and instead
allows most expenditures for self-created intellectual capital to be
deducted immediately.l00
95. Id. at 88-89.
96. Id. at 89-90. INDOPCO raised taxpayer concerns about the possibility of a greatly expanded
capitalization requirement, but these have proved to be unfounded. See Joseph Bankman, The Story of
INDOPCO: What Went Wrong in the Capitalization v. Deduction Debate?, in TAX STORIES, 238-45
(Paul L. Caron ed., 2d ed. 2009). Subsequent case law and regulatory guidance adopt a considerably
diminished capitalization requirement. See infra notes 108-123 and accompanying text; Bankman,
supra, at 240-45.
97. This broad conception of intellectual capital tracks closely with Corrado, Hulten, and
Sichel's expansive taxonomy of intellectual capital investments. See supra note 78. The Court in effect
held that National Starch's expenditures related to it being acquired by Unilever were capital
enhancements to National Starch's goodwill. See Johnson, Dividends, supra note 80, at 466-67, 476.
98. See, e.g., Johnson, Big Win, supra note 80, at 1332-38 (predicting capitalization of a variety
of other previously deductible expenses including prepaid fees, business expansion costs,
environmental cleanup costs, and remedial costs). Johnson is one of the few who wrote approvingly of
INDOPCO's expansive view of capitalization. See, e.g., id at 1340-41. Many practitioners and
lobbyists were highly critical of it. See Bankman, supra note 96, at 238-40 (describing the negative
reactions to the decision).
99. James L. Atkinson, The Final INDOPCO Regulations: A Primer, 56 TAX EXECUTIVE 222,
224 (2004).
100. See Bankman, supra note 96, at 240-250 (describing subsequent judicial decisions on
capitalization and the administrative response and concluding that the INDOPCO decision was a
failure); Lee, Transaction Costs, supra note 80 (describing the audit and litigation challenges faced by
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in attempting to implement a broad capitalization principle, the
congressional and judicial resistance to such efforts, and the IRS's retreat).
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a. Acquired Intellectual Capitall ''
Where a business acquires intangible assets, as defined in I.R.C.
§ 197,102 from a third party as part of a taxable acquisition of a larger
business,10 3  the purchaser capitalizes and amortizes most of those
intangible assets ratably over fifteen years. 104 Where intangible assets are
purchased separately and not as part of a larger business, their treatment is
quite varied. Some of them, such as customer lists, are subject to the
fifteen-year amortization rule of I.R.C. § 197.105 Others, such as patents
and copyrights, are excluded from the fifteen-year amortization rule and
instead are treated under other applicable tax laws. 0 6 For example, the
101. Tax law does not use the term "intellectual capital." Rather, it uses "intangibles" and
"intangible assets," as defined in a variety of statutory provisions and regulations. See, e.g. I.R.C.
§ 197 (2012). There is a fair amount of overlap between these tax terms and intellectual capital as
defined in this Article. The following discussion generally uses the tax terms "intangibles" and
"intangible assets" interchangeably with the term "intellectual capital" and notes where the two terms
diverge.
102. The definition of intangibles under I.R.C. § 197 includes (but is not limited to): goodwill;
going concern value; workforce in place; business books and records; operating systems or other
information bases including customer lists; patents; copyrights; formulas; processes; designs;
knowhow; customer-based intangibles; supplier-based intangibles; licenses; permits; other rights
granted by a governmental unit; covenants not compete; franchises; trademarks; and trade names.
I.R.C. § 197(d)(1). Certain intangibles such as computer software, oil and gas exploration, and
financial intangibles are excluded from the general treatment of intangibles under 1.R.C. § 197, but
they are still considered intangibles for other tax purposes. See id. § 197(e).
103. In general, an acquisition is taxable when cash or other property is the sole or primary
consideration for the acquisition; an acquisition is tax-free when equity of the acquiring party is the
sole or primary consideration for the acquisition. See 1.R.C. §§ 354, 368; Michael L. Schler, Basic Tax
Issues in Acquisition Transactions, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 879, 882 (2012). I.R.C. § 197 applies to
taxable acquisitions (i.e., purchases) but not to tax-free acquisitions. See Jack S. Levin & Donald E.
Rocap, A Transactional Guide to New Code Section 197, TAX NOTES 462 (Oct. 25, 1993),
https://www.kirkland.com/siteFiles/kirkexp/publications/2582/Document]/Transactiona / 2OGuide / 2
Oto%2ONew%/2OCode2OSectiono20l97.pdf. Where intangible assets are acquired in a tax-free
acquisition, the acquiring party generally "stands in the shoes" of the selling party to determine
treatment of the intangibles. See I.R.C. § 197(f)(2); MARK J. SILVERMAN, STEPTOE & JOHNSON,
PURCHASE PRICE ALLOCATION RULES: SECTIONS 1060, 338, and 197, 55 (2013),
http://www.steptoe.com/publications-1630.html.
104. See I.R.C. §§ 197, 338, 1060. See generally MARTIN D. GINSBURG ET AL., MERGERS,
ACQUISITIONS AND BUYOUTS 403.4.1.1-403.4.2 (2012); Levin & Rocap, supra note 103, at 461-
62; Schler, supra note 103, at 887, 896; SILVERMAN, supra note 103, at 41-43, 45-52.
Certain intangible assets are eligible for amortization over shorter time periods or outright
deduction. See Levin & Rocap, supra note 103, at 463-66. For example, taxpayers amortize off-the-
shelf computer software purchased as part of a business over three years rather than fifteen. See I.R.C.
§§ 167(f), 197(e)(3). Taxpayers may deduct the cost of a franchise, trademark, or trade name where
the purchase price is contingent on its use or productivity. See id. §§ 197(f)(4)(C), 1253(d)(1).
105. See id. § 197(d)(1)(c)(iv); Levin & Rocap, supra note 103, at 466.
106. See I.R.C. § 167(g); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.167(a)-3, (a)-14 (2016); Nguyen & Maine, supra note
80. at 19-21.
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acquirer of a patent amortizes its cost over the remaining legal life of the
patent.1 1
7
b. Self-Created Intellectual Capital
Under Treasury regulations issued in 2004-known as the INDOPCO
regulations because they address many of the questions and uncertainties
raised by that case-taxpayers may deduct immediately most investments
in self-created intellectual capital.10 8 The INDOPCO regulations set forth
an exclusive list of eight relatively narrow types of intangible assets whose
development or creation costs businesses must capitalize.'0 9 Even though
other self-created intangibles in theory might be subject to capitalization,
in practice, the INDOPCO regulations permit taxpayers to deduct all other
self-created intangibles "without hesitation."110  One commentator
characterizes the INDOPCO regulations as a "reversal of the notion that
'capitalization is the norm,' with deductibility-at least in the context of
created intangibles-now being the default rule." '' Another has suggested
107. See Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-14(c).
108. See Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-4 (2013). The regulations set forth an exclusive list of eight
relatively narrow types of intangible assets whose development or creation costs are subject to
capitalization: (1) financial interests such as stock, debt and other financial instruments, and annuities;
(2) prepaid expenses such as prepaid insurance or rent; (3) membership or privileges such as a doctor's
payment to a hospital for lifetime staff privileges; (4) payments to governments for trademarks,
copyrights, permits, licenses, and franchises; (5) contract rights to use or be compensated for the use of
property, covenants not to compete, stand-still agreements, insurance policies, endowments, or
annuities; (6) contract terminations; (7) amounts paid for real property where the taxpayer transfers
ownership but retains significant economic benefits; and (8) defense or perfection of title of intangible
property. See id. § 1.263(a)-4(d); Yale, INDOPCO Regulations, supra note 80, at 440; Johnson,
Destroying the Tax Base, supra note 80, at 1382; Atkinson, supra note 99, at 229 (stating that the final
INDOPCO regulations have made deductibility the norm for self-created intangibles).
109. See Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-4(d), supra note 108 and accompanying text. See also Yale,
INDOPCO Regulations, supra note 80, at 440. See generally Atkinson, supra note 99; Johnson,
Destroying the Tax Base, supra note 80, at 1382.
Excluded from the scope of the INDOPCO regulations are two types of self-created intellectual
capital. First, costs related to business acquisitions, restructuring, and recapitalizations must be
capitalized in some cases. See Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-5; Atkinson, supra note 99, at 228-29;
Silverman, supra note 103, at 62-64; Yale, INDOPCO Regulations, supra note 80, at 454-55. Second,
costs of developing films, sound recordings, video, and books are subject to the more expansive
capitalization rules applicable to tangible property. I.R.C. § 263A(a)-(b) (2012). Writers,
photographers and artists are exempt from these capitalization requirements. See id § 263A(h).
110. Yale, INDOPCO Regulations, supra note 80, at 437; see id. at 438 (speculating that the
INDOPCO regulations might be invalid and thus might be supplanted by the more expensive
capitalization required under INDOPCO and other legal precedent but concluding that, as a practical
matter, taxpayers can rely on the regulations); see also Atkinson, supra note 99, at 224.
111. Atkinson, supra note 99, at 229.
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that a more apt name for the regulations would be the "Anti-INDOPCO
regulations."" 2
Both prior to and after the Supreme Court's decision in INDOPCO, an
extensive body of case law and administrative guidance allowed
deductions for many specific types of intellectual capital investments."1
3
Expenses that were deductible before INDOPCO and continue to be
deductible afterwards include computer software development costs,
114
scientific R&D,' 15 and mineral exploration such as intangible drilling costs
and mining exploration costs." 6 In cases decided after 1NDOPCO, several
courts have allowed financial services businesses to deduct market
research related to new product development,'1 7 and one case upheld a
bank's deduction for employee compensation and overhead attributable to
loan origination." 8 Advertising is generally deductible, as it was before
JNDOPCO,119 as are employer-provided worker training costs. 2  Two
112. See Yale, INDOPCO Regulations, supra note 80, at 436.
113. Although the INDOPCO regulations could be interpreted to preempt prior law relating to the
capitalization of intangibles, they do not explicitly do so. Furthermore, there is the possibility that the
INDOPCO regulations might be invalid and supplanted by other legal precedent. See Yale, supra note
80, at 438.
114. See Rev. Proc. 69-21, 1969-2 C.B. 303 (holding that the IRS will not challenge a taxpayer's
decision to currently deduct costs attributable to software development), superseded on other grounds
by Rev. Proc. 2000-50, 2000-1 C.B. 601, modified in part by Rev. Proc. 2007-16, 2007-1 C.B. 358.
115. SeeI.R.C. § 174(a)(1) (2012).
116. See id. §§ 263(c), 617.
117. See, e.g., NCNB Corp. v. United States, 684 F.2d 285, 294 (4th Cir. 1982). However, one
case required a financial services business to capitalize market research where it related to a possible
business expansion, i.e., the opening of a new branch. See Cent. Tex. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. United
States, 731 F.2d 1181, 1182, 1185 (5th Cir. 1984). This is consistent with the treatment of "start-up
costs"-costs incurred before the taxpayer is actually engaged in a trade or business-which generally
must be capitalized. See I.R.C. § 195(a). See generally John W. Lee, Start-Up Costs, Section 195, and
Clear Reflection of Income: A Tale of Talismans, Tacked-On Tax Reform, and a Touch of Basics, 6
VA. TAX REV. 1 (1986) (providing an in-depth analysis of I.R.C. § 195, particularly the conflict
between the definitional and functional tests for the capitalization of start-up business costs, as well as
the judicial development and practical impact of the provision).
118. See PNC Bancorp Inc. v. Comm'r, 212 F.3d 822, 824 (3d Cir. 2000). However, in another
case, the tax court required a financial services business to capitalize employee compensation related
to the acquisition of installment obligations. See Lychuk v. Comm'r, 116 T.C. 374, 375 (2001). The
INDOPCO regulations require capitalization of costs related to the creation of financial intangibles
such as loans, but because of the exceptions for employee compensation, overhead, and de minimis
expenses, loan origination costs are generally not subject to capitalization under the regulations. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-4(e)(4) (2013).
119. See Rev. Rul. 92-80, 1992-2 C.B. 57. There are some limited cases where capitalization of
advertising expenses has been required. See, e.g., Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. United States, 7
Cl. Ct. 220, 231-33 (1985) (requiring capitalization of advertising to defuse opposition to the
taxpayer's application for a license to construct a nuclear plant where the expansion to nuclear power
represented a new business).
120. See Rev. Rul. 96-62, 1996-2 C.B. 9. A few cases have held that worker training costs had to
be capitalized. See, e.g., Cleveland Elec., 7 Cl. Ct. at 227-29 (holding that a utility's expansion from
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years after INDOPCO, the IRS ruled that businesses could deduct
severance payments related to a corporate downsizing.'21 Several years
after that, a federal appeals court held that a bank could deduct
compensation, legal fees, and investigatory fees paid in connection with its
acquisition of another bank.122 The IRS has also ruled that a utility
company could deduct costs incurred to improve energy conservation and
efficiency. 123
In sum, notwithstanding the Supreme Court's decision in INDOPCO,
which affirmed capitalization as a fundamental principle of income tax law
and held that taxpayers must capitalize investments in intellectual capital,
other provisions of the tax law allow capital owners to deduct almost all
costs of self-created intellectual capital.
3. The Magnitude of the Subsidy for Intellectual Capital
The tax subsidy for self-created intellectual capital makes it less costly
for capital owners to propertize labor, which magnifies their ability to
capture a greater share of the returns from their workers. 124 A deduction
for an investment is equivalent to a tax exemption on the income from that
investment. 125 Thus, the deduction for self-created intellectual capital
effectively imposes a zero rate of tax on returns from this capital,
providing a substantial subsidy to capital. 126 The exact magnitude of the
subsidy is difficult to ascertain. Self-created intellectual capital likely
constitutes a significant proportion of total investments in intellectual
capital because most organizational capital, such as good will, is self-
created.1
27
coal powered electricity to nuclear power was a new business, and therefore, costs related to it were
capital).
121. See Rev. Rul. 94-77, 1994-2 C.B. 19.
122. Wells Fargo & Co. v. Comm'r, 224 F.3d 874 (8th Cir. 2000).
123. See Rev. Rul. 95-32, 1995-16 I.R.B. 8. This ruling pre-dates INDOPCO, but the IRS did not
repeal or modify it after the INDOPCO decision.
124. It also results in misallocations of resources and inefficiencies. See Kahng, supra note 80, at
2263-67; Johnson, Undertaxation of Intangibles, supra note 80, at 1289-91.
125. See E. Cary Brown, Business-Income Taxation and Investment Incentives, in INCOME,
EMPLOYMENT AND PUBLIC POLICY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ALVIN H. HANSEN 300, 309-10 (1948).
126. See Johnson, Undertaxation of Intangibles, supra note 80, at 1289-91; Weisbach, supra note
80, at 200 ("[T]ax law .... allows an immediate deduction, effectively choosing not to tax the return
to [intangible benefit] activities at all."); Yale, Capitalization Exceptions, supra note 80, at 555 (noting
that misidentifying a capital cost as a deductible can cause over or under taxation).
Chris Sanchirico makes a similar observation about the deductibility of self-created goodwill,
brand names, and other intangibles in his analysis of carried interest. See infra notes 170-171 and
accompanying text.
127. 1 am indebted to Daniel Sichel for insights and information about the mix of acquired and
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To provide a sense of the magnitude of the tax subsidy for self-created
intellectual capital, economists estimate that the U.S. Bureau of Economic
Analysis, in its measures of economic productivity, expenses, rather than
capitalizes, $1 trillion or more of yearly investments in intellectual
capital. 128 Assuming a comparably large amount is deducted for tax
purposes, the subsidy is substantial. Furthermore, in 2014, the Finance
Committee and House Ways & Means Committee proposed to require
capitalization of just two types of costs-scientific R&D and
advertising-and estimated that such a change would raise $362 billion in
tax revenues over ten years.1 29 Because these two types of costs comprise
only a fraction of all intellectual capital investments, a more
comprehensive capitalization requirement for self-created intangibles
would increase tax revenues by several times that estimate.' 
30
The tax subsidy for self-created intellectual capital nominally benefits
the capital owners who make the expenditures involved in its creation, but
determining who ultimately benefits is a complex empirical question that
has not yet been studied. The tax subsidy for self-created intellectual
capital might cause more resources to be allocated to intellectual capital
relative to other investments, such as plant or equipment.131 In other
words, the tax subsidy might result in the intellectual capital "pie"
growing bigger, and the question is then, who benefits from the bigger pie:
intellectual capital owners, their workers, or both?1 32 Another way to
self-created intellectual capital. With respect to organizational capital, businesses do sometimes
acquire it through the acquisition of an ongoing business. However, this is likely a small fraction of
total organizational capital investments because only a small proportion of all companies change hands
during a given time period. Experts estimate that mergers and acquisitions volume has averaged 6.5%
of total global market capitalization over the last thirty years. SEE STEFANO GATTI & CARLO
CHIARELLA, M&A IN UNCERTAIN TIMES: Is THERE STILL VALUE IN GROWING? 1 (2013),
http://www.goldmansachs.com/ our-thinking/archive/bocconi-conference-2013/bocconi-report.pdf.
128. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
129. See U.S. S. COMM. ON FINANCE, 113TH CONG., SUMMARY OF STAFF DISCUSSION DRAFT:
COST RECOVERY AND ACCOUNTING 8 (2013) [hereinafter U.S. S. COMM. ON FINANCE, COST
RECOVERY]; Tax Reform Act of2014, 113th Cong. § 3108 (Discussion Draft 2014) 55-56 [hereinafter
Tax Reform Act of 2014 Discussion Draft], http://waysandmeans.house.gov/uploadedfiles/statutory
text tax reform act of 2014_discussion draft 022614.pdf (proposing to capitalize and amortize
over five years R&D and fifty percent of advertising).
130. Economists estimate scientific R&D to comprise less than one-fifth of all investments in
intellectual capital. See Corrado et al., Intangible Capital, supra note 27, at 671 tbl.1. For the years
2000-2003, they estimate total annual investment in intellectual capital to be $1.226 trillion and
scientific R&D to be $230.5 billion. Id.
131. See Kahng, supra note 80, at 2263-64.
132. Leandra Lederman has similarly argued that the tax law's liberal loss deductibility rules for
active trades and businesses under I.R.C. § 162 encourage investment in active businesses as compared
to passive investments. See Leandra Lederman, The Entrepreneurship Effect: An Accidental
Externality in the Federal Income Tax, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1401, 1444-55 (2004).
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analyze this question is to consider the consequences of eliminating the tax
subsidy for intellectual capital. Eliminating the subsidy (that is, requiring
capitalization of the costs of creating intellectual capital) would increase
business owners' post-tax costs for self-created intellectual capital, which
might cause them to reduce wages. On the other hand, requiring
capitalization would make propertization more costly for business owners,
which would in turn reduce their share of the returns from economic
productivity (assuming it is true that propertization enables business
owners to increase their share of returns). In addition, capitalization would
help to equalize the treatment of business owners and workers in the
development of human capital.
B. Human Capital Investments
Scholars such as Katherine Stone argue that employers, by controlling
their workers through restrictive covenants and other legal mechanisms, in
effect acquire ownership of human capital. 133 These scholars acknowledge
this claim is somewhat metaphorical because except for the case of
slavery, human capital, unlike other forms of capital, is not entirely
marketable and controllable. 134 As Gary Becker states, "you cannot
separate a person from his or her knowledge, skills, health, or values the
way it is possible to move financial and physical assets while the owner
stays put.'
135
Metaphor or not, what is literally true is that business owners make
human capital investments in their workers' 36 and treat them as valuable,
133. See Stone, supra note 49; Joellen Riley, Who Owns Human Capital? A Critical Appraisal of
Legal Techniques for Capturing the Value of Work, 18 J. AUSTL. LABOUR L. 1, 24 (2005) (describing
the term "[h]uman capital" as a "colourful metaphor for the contribution that people's work and talent
make in commercial enterprise"). But see PIKETTY, supra note 6, at 223 (questioning whether human
capital is illusory).
134. See Riley, supra note 133, at 24.
135. GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS WITH
SPECIAL REFERENCE TO EDUCATION 16 (3d ed. 1993).
136. Intellectual capital and human capital are closely related but not coterminous. Broadly
speaking, human capital refers to resources in people or human capabilities that produce future
monetary and psychic income. See id. at 15-16. Intellectual capital focuses on businesses' investment
in and production of intangible sources of future value, which often require a high proportion of labor
inputs. Human capital focuses on an individual's capabilities to produce future value. Capital owners
can make human capital investments in their workers-training, for example-and workers can also
make human capital investments in themselves. Investment in human capital includes formal
education, on-the-job training, healthcare, and migration. Theodore W. Schultz, Investment in Human
Capital, 51 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 9-13 (1961). But see PIKETTY, supra note 6, at 223 (suggesting that
human capital is illusory).
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albeit risky and difficult to manage, assets. 37 As discussed above, they are
particularly inclined to make human capital investments in their workers
when propertization enables them to capture the return on these
investments.1la  Workers similarly make human capital investments in
themselves, although, as discussed above, they are less likely to do so
when the returns are likely to redound to the benefit of their employers.'
39
The tax law treats human capital investments differently depending on
who makes the investments, as Mary Louise Fellows and I have argued. 140
When capital owners make investments in human capital and otherwise
incur human-capital related expenses in their production of income, the
law recognizes these are legitimate costs of economic production and
allows them to be offset (that is, deducted) in the computation of taxable
income.1 41 In contrast, when workers make the same investments and incur
the same expenses in their production of income, the law either treats these
costs as entirely personal expenses or otherwise places limits on the ability
Scholars typically measure returns to human capital by reference to individuals' increased income
resulting from investments in education, healthcare, and the like. See generally BECKER, supra note
135, at 147-200 (providing an empirical analysis of the effect of college education on earnings and
productivity); Dale W. Jorgenson & Barbara M. Fraumeni, The Accumulation of Human and
Nonhuman Capital, 1948-84, in THE MEASUREMENT OF SAVING, INVESTMENT, AND WEALTH 227-78
(Robert E. Lipsey & Helen Stone Tice eds., 1989) (estimating, inter alia, the effect of education on
lifetime labor income); Luca Benzoni & Olena Chyruk, The Value and Risk of Human Capital, 7 ANN.
REV. FIN. ECON. 179 (2015) (surveying the theoretical and empirical approaches to valuing human
capital).
137. See BECKER, supra note 135, at 20-21; Rita Almeida & Pedro Carneiro. The Return to Firm
Investments in Human Capital, 16 LABOUR ECON. 97 (2009). As Mousumi Battycharya and Patrick
Wright state, in describing the challenges of managing what they call "human capital assets":
[H]uman capital is different from other real assets in a few ways. First, human capital is
almost entirely intangible and is difficult to quantify .... Second, unlike other forms of asset,
a firm never fully 'owns' its human capital. The knowledge, skills, and abilities reside in the
people, and are lost when people leave the firm. Therefore there is a unique risk associated
with human capital, the risk of capital loss or turnover (i.e., the asset "walking away")....
Third, non-financial investments like time, communication, and leadership constitute a major
part of investments that generate returns from human capital through eliciting commitment
and competency of employees over the long run. These combined with the fact that human
capital is almost never tradable in the market, makes management of this form of asset a more
difficult task.
Mousumi Battacharya & Patrick M. Wright, Options for Human Capital Acquisition, in THE
ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO STRATEGIC HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (John Storey et al. eds.,
2008).
138. See Garmaise, supra note 57, at 413-14 (finding that employers invest more in their
employees' human capital when they can restrict their employees' mobility through the use of
covenants not to compete).
139. See id. (finding that employees invest less in their own human capital when they are bound to
their employers by restrictive covenants).
140. See Mary Louise Fellows & Lily Kahng, Costly Mistakes: Undertaxed Business Owners and
Overtaxed Workers, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 329 (2013).
141. Seeid.at370-80.
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of workers to offset them against taxable income. In this way, the tax law
undertaxes capital owners and overtaxes workers.
142
Education is the most important example of the disparate treatment of
business owners' and workers' investments in human capital. Gary Becker
cites education and training as "the most important investments in human
capital."143 Yet, from the earliest days of the income tax, the courts and
IRS have denied workers the ability to deduct their educational expenses
except under limited circumstances. 144  The IRS acknowledges that
education might be a human capital investment, but allows no deduction
or capitalization of educational expenses because they are "an inseparable
aggregate of personal and capital expenditures." 145 Although tax law
142. See id.
143. BECKER, supra note 135, at 17; see also PIKETrY, supra note 6, at 306-07. Education
unquestionably contributes to workers' productivity. SEE SANDRA E. BLACK & LISA M. LYNCH,
HUMAN-CAPITAL INVESTMENTS AND PRODUCTIVITY, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 263 (1996). Economists and
policy makers perennially bemoan the future of the under-educated U.S. workforce and call for more
government investment in education, particularly in light of the economy's shift from manufacturing
to services and technology. See generally DALE NEEF, THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY (1998); ROBERT
REICH, THE WORK OF NATIONS: PREPARING OURSELVES FOR 21sT CENTURY CAPITALISM (1992);
Walter W. Powell & Kaisa Snellman, The Knowledge Economy, 30 ANN. REV. SOC. 199, 199-201
(2004); TASK FORCE ON THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN INNOVATION, THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY: IS
THE UNITED STATES LOSING ITS COMPETITIVE EDGE? (2005), http//futureofinnovation.org/PDF/
Benchmarks.pdf, JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, PUBLIC POLICY FOR KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY (1999),
http://akgul.bilkent.edu.tr/BT-BE/knowledge-economy.pdf. Another metric demonstrating the income-
producing value of education is the link between higher educational levels and higher incomes. For
example, in 2010, those with a college degree earned about sixty-six percent more than those with a
high school degree; those with a professional or doctoral degree earned more than two and a half times
the amount earned by high school degree holders. U. S. DEP'T. OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, EMPLOYMENT PROJECTIONS, EDUCATION PAYS (2011), http://www.bls.gov
/emp/epchart 001.htm. The correlation between levels of education and income is strong and
persistent. See Stuart Lazar, Schooling Congress.: The Current Landscape of the Tax Treatment of
Higher Education Expenses and a Framework for Reform, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1047, 1049-51
(2010); SANDY BAUM ET AL., COLLEGE BOARD ADVOCACY AND POLICY CENTER, EDUCATION PAYS
2010: THE BENEFITS OF HIGHER EDUCATION FOR INDIVIDUALS AND SOCIETY 11-17 (2010),
http://trends.college board.org/downloads/EducationPays20l0.pdf.
144. See, e.g., I.T. 1520, 1-2 C.B. 145 (1922), revoked by I.T. 2688, Xll-1 C.B. 250 (1933)
(holding that research expenses by a college professor were personal, nondeductible expenses); Appeal
of Driscoll, 4 B.T.A. 1008 (1926) (holding that voice lessons in preparation for a professional singing
career were personal). For a detailed account of the history of the tax treatment of educational
expenses, see Jay Katz, The Deductibility of Education Costs: Why Does Congress Allow the IRS to
Take Your Education So Personally?, 17 VA. TAX REV. 1, 17-37 (1997); Lazar, supra note 143, at
1057-68; James L. Musselman, Federal Income Tax Deductibility of Higher Education Costs: The
Good. the Bad, and the Ugly, 35 CAP. U. L. REv. 923, 927-34 (2007).
145. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(1) (as amended in 1967); see Lazar, supra note 143, at 1059, 1072.
Only under limited circumstances is a worker allowed to deduct higher educational expenses: (1) the
education must maintain or improve her skills in her trade or business or (2) it must be required by her
employer or by law. In any case, the education acquired cannot be necessary to meet the minimum
qualifications for the worker's trade or business, and it cannot qualify the worker for a new trade or
business. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5.
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provides several subsidies for education, such as a deduction for student
loan interest and tax credits for educational expense, all of these
provisions are classified as special tax preferences rather than as legitimate
costs of producing income. 146 In contrast, business owners' expenditures
for worker training or education are usually deductible immediately as
I.R.C. § 162 trade or business expenses. At worst, business owners may
have to capitalize these expenditures and amortize them over some period
of years. 147
As with education, tax law treats as purely personal many other
expenditures that are at least in part human capital investments or costs
related to the production of income. For example, two other major
categories of expenditures that are integral to workers' productivity are
health and child care costs. As with education, both of these suffer from
having personal and social dimensions that do not fit comfortably within
the traditional business model of economic productivity. Because
businesses do not literally own human capital, they do not incur child care
and medical expenses in the production of income. 148 Workers' child care
146. In addition to this limited I.R.C. § 162 deduction for the costs of higher education, the tax
law provides several tax preferences for education, including the I.R.C. § 25A American Opportunity
Credit and Lifetime Learning Credit, the I.R.C. § 221 deduction for educational loan interest, the
I.R.C. § 527 exclusion for employer-provided educational assistance, the I.R.C. § 529 exclusion for
qualified tuition programs, and the I.R.C. § 530 exclusion for "Coverdell" education savings accounts.
For a complete list of tax preferences for education, see Lazar, supra note 143, at 1074-1107.
However, all of these provisions are classified as tax expenditures-that is, preferences that purposely
reduce tax liability below "normal" levels in order to advance social policy goals-rather than as
legitimate costs of producing income under the Schanz-Haig-Simons definition of income. See STAFF
OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 112TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL
YEARS 2011-2015, at 10, 12-14 (Comm. Print 2012) [hereinafter Joint Committee Tax Expenditure
Estimates].
Many scholars have criticized the current tax treatment of educational expenses and have argued
that they ought to be at least partially deductible or capitalized and recoverable in future years in order
to measure income from labor accurately. See, e.g., David S. Davenport, Education and Human
Capital: Pursuing an Ideal Income Tax and a Sensible Tax Policy, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 793
(1992); Katz, supra note 144; Lazar, supra note 143; Michael Simkovic, The Knowledge Tax, 82 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1981 (2015). But see Joseph M. Dodge, Taxing Human Capital Acquisition Costs-Or
Why Costs of Higher Education Should Not Be Deducted or Amortized, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 927 (1993)
(arguing that higher education expenses should not be amortized).
147. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
148. It's interesting to contemplate how the tax law would tax slave owners if legal slavery existed
today. There is little historic guidance because in the pre-Civil War era, slave owners paid primarily
property and excise taxes on their slaves. See generally ROBIN L. EINHORN, AMERICA TAXATION,
AMERICAN SLAVERY (2008) (providing a historical account of the influence of slavery on United
States tax law and policy); Joel S. Newman, Slave Tax as Sin Tax: 18'h and 19'h Century Perspectives,
101 TAX NOTES 1019 (2003) (describing the history of federal taxes on slavery). States that had
income taxes, such as Virginia, exempted slave owners from tax. See CHARLES NORDHOFF, AMERICA
FOR FREE WORKING MEN! 14-16 (1865). However, there is evidence that slave owners considered
their slaves to be valuable investments and kept meticulous records of their value and productivity. See
636
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expenses are viewed as personal because it is a personal decision whether
to have children. Workers are eligible for a modest credit for childcare
expenses or can exclude from income a relatively small value of
employer-provided childcare. 149 Congress treats these provisions as special
tax preferences for personal expenditures, as opposed to allowances that
account for legitimate costs in the production of income. 50 Similarly,
Congress allows workers to deduct medical expenses and provides
additional special tax preferences related to healthcare, but in all cases
characterizes health care expenditures as personal, and not as investments
in human capital.'
5
'
Caitlin Rosenthal, Slavery's Scientific Management: Masters and Managers, in SLAVERY'S
CAPITALISM: A NEW HISTORY OF AMERICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (Sven Beckert & Seth
Rockman eds., 2016) (finding that slave owners kept highly detailed records of the value and
productivity of slaves and depreciated them over time, foreshadowing modem management practices).
If one imagines the unimaginable-a world in which slavery existed legally in the United States
today-it seems quite plausible that slave owners would be allowed to deduct or capitalize costs of
providing shelter, training, healthcare, food, and childcare to their slaves, expenses that are all
disallowed as personal expenses when free workers incur them.
149. See I.R.C. § 21 (2012) (childcare credit); I.R.C. § 129 (exclusion for employer-provided child
care).
150. See Joint Committee Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra note 146, at 14. Many scholars have
criticized the tax law's treatment of child care expenses and posited that they ought to be at least
partially deductible under a Schanz-Haig-Simons definition of income. See, e.g., Grace Blumberg,
Sexism in the Code: A Comparative Study of Income Taxation of Working Wives and Mothers, 21
BUFF. L. REV. 49 (1971); Mary Louise Fellows, Rocking the Tax Code: A Case Study of Employment-
Related Child-Care Expenditures, 10 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 307 (1998); Mary L. Heen, Welfare
Reform, Child Care Costs, and Taxes: Delivering Increased Work-Related Child Care Benefits to
Low-Income Families, 13 YALE L. & POLY REV. 173 (1995); Shannon Weeks McCormack,
Overtaxing the Working Family: Uncle Sam and the Childcare Squeeze, 114 MICH. L. REV. 559
(2016); Allan J. Samansky, Child Care Expenses and the Income Tax, 50 FLA. L. REV. 245 (1998);
Lawrence Zelenak, Children and the Income Tax, 49 TAX L. REV. 349 (1994). But see Tsilly Dagan,
Ordinary People, Necessary Choices: A Comparative Study of Childcare Expenses, 11 THEORETICAL
INQ. L. 589, 625 (2010) (arguing that the Schanz-Haig-Simons definition is incapable of adequately
reflecting outlays, such as child care, and advocating for the adoption of additional norms into the
definition of income).
151. Medical expenses are deductible under I.R.C. § 213, but they are classified as personal
deductions rather than costs related to the production of income. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON
TAXATION, 99TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, at 50 (Comm.
Print 1987) (stating that "medical expenses essentially are personal expenses and thus, like food,
clothing, and other expenditures of living and other consumption expenditures, generally should not be
deductible in measuring taxable income"). In addition, the medical expense deduction has always been
limited by a significant "floor" tied to adjusted gross income-that is, a taxpayer can deduct only those
medical expenses in excess of a percentage (currently ten percent) of her adjusted gross income. See
I.R.C. § 213(a). In addition, the medical expense deduction is "below-the-line," so only those
taxpayers who itemize their deductions can deduct any of their medical expenses. 1.R.C. § §§ 62(a)(1),
63.
In addition to I.R.C. § 213, there are other tax provisions related to health care. The law excludes
from income employer-provided health insurance. I.R.C. § 106(a). It also excludes from income
medical expenses paid from Flexible Spending Arrangements, I.R.C. § 125, and Medical
Reimbursement Plans, I.R.C. §§ 105, 106. In addition, I.R.C. § 106 provides for tax deferred treatment
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In addition to education, child care, and health care, workers incur a
variety of expenditures related to their work, such as outlays for
commuting, clothing, and food and lodging, to name a few noteworthy
examples. These are often described as "mixed personal and business"
expenses, which reflects the reality that these expenditures have an
element of consumption but are also connected to the worker's trade or
business. 15 Yet, tax law generally treats these outlays as purely personal.
The cost of commuting, for example, has long been held to be
nondeductible on the grounds that it is the taxpayer's personal choice
whether, and how far, to live from his or her place of work. 53 Similarly,
clothing is considered a purely personal expense except in rare instances
(such as police or military uniforms), even when such clothing is required
as a condition of employment and is worn exclusively at work. 5 4 Food
and lodging expenses are also treated as nondeductible personal expenses
except in limited circumstances. 155
With respect to mixed personal and business expenses, business owners
enjoy a greater ability than workers to deduct their costs of producing
income under § 162. For example, business owners can deduct business-
related travel, lodging and meal expenses paid on behalf of their workers,
and these amounts are also fully excluded from the income of their
of amounts invested in Health Savings Accounts. As is true for tax provisions on education and child
care, all of these health care provisions are treated as tax expenditures. See Joint Committee Tax
Expenditure Estimates, supra note 146, at 42 (listing the medical expense deduction, employer-paid
health insurance, medical savings accounts, and other related items as tax expenditures).
152. See, e.g., Thomas D. Griffith, Efficient Taxation of Mixed Personal and Business Expenses,
41 UCLA L. REV. 1769, 1770 (1994). In measuring poverty, the National Academy of Sciences
recommended that work-related expenses such as commuting, child care, and the purchase of tools and
uniforms be treated as nondiscretionary expenses and subtracted from resources. See MEASURING
POVERTY: A NEW APPROACH 4-5 (Constance F. Citro & Robert T. Michael eds., 1995). In 2011, an
interagency task force including the U.S. Census Bureau, the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the Council of
Economic Advisers, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, and the Office of
Management and Budget adopted this recommendation. See KATHLEEN SHORT, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, THE RESEARCH SUPPLEMENTAL POVERTY MEASURE: 2010, at 21-
22 (2011), http://www.census.gov/hhes/povmeas/methodology/supplemental/research/Short_ Research
SPM201O.pdf.
153. Comm'r v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465, 473-74 (1946). See generally Tsilly Dagan, Commuting,
26 VA. TAX REV. 185 (2006); William A. Klein, Income Taxation and Commuting Expenses: Tax
Policy and the Need for Nonsimplistic Analysis of "Simple" Problems, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 871
(1969).
154. See Pevsner v. Comm'r, 628 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1980). Clothing expenses are deductible only
if the clothing is worn exclusively at work, as a condition of employment, and is not adaptable for
general usage as ordinary clothing. Id. at 469.
155. See I.R.C. § 119 (providing an exclusion from income for meals and lodging provided to an
employee by the employer "for the convenience of the employer"); I.R.C. § 162(a)(2) (allowing
deduction for food and lodging "while away from home in the pursuit of a trade or business").
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workers. 156 In contrast, when workers incur their own business-related
travel, lodging and meal expenses, the expenses are more likely to be
treated as personal, nondeductible expenditures. 157 Furthermore, even if
the expenditures qualify as business-related deductions, there are structural
limitations such as the two percent floor that limits workers' ability to
make use of these deductions.'58
In sum, the tax law, by allowing capital owners to deduct the costs of
self-created intellectual capital, subsidizes the propertization of labor and
enhances capital owners' ability to appropriate a greater share of the return
at the expense of their workers' share. In addition, the disparate treatment
of capital owners' and workers' human capital investments adds to capital
owners' tax advantages relative to workers. 59 In these heretofore
unexamined ways, the tax law puts a heavy thumb on the scale in favor of
capital owners; a scale, as Piketty has shown, that already tilts in their
favor.
III. RECONSIDERING THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN LABOR AND CAPITAL
A. A Porous and Changeable Boundary
Part I described how capital owners are able to use intellectual
property, contract, and employment laws to propertize labor inputs into the
creation of intellectual capital. Their ability to do so is expanding as a
result of the evolving legal landscape, and the boundary between labor and
capital is shifting. This suggests that the boundary is not fixed and
immutable, but rather porous and changeable. 60 This Part explores the tax
implications of a boundary of this nature and calls into question the tax
law's fundamental labor-capital dichotomy.
156. See Fellows & Kahng, supra note 140, at 370-76.
157. See id. at372-76.
158. See id. at 370-72.
159. These subsidies for capital owners also result in misallocations of resources and
inefficiencies. See Fellows & Kahng, supra note 140, at 380-87; Johnson, Undertaxation of
Intangibles, supra note 80, at 1289-91; Kahng, supra note 80, at 2263-67.
160. See Bankman & Shaviro, supra note 7, at 458 (observing that "'labor' and 'capital' are not
nearly as distinct, either economically or socially, as [Piketty] may appear to suggest"); Victor
Fleischer, Alpha: Labor Is the New Capital, TAX L. REV., at 3 (forthcoming 2016) (referring to a
blurring of the distinction between income from labor and income from capital in in his analysis of
what he calls "alpha income", that is, carried interest, founders stock, and equity-based executive
compensation). In contrast, Piketty believes the distinction between capital income and labor income is
becoming sharper: "[Tlhe growing sophistication of capital markets and financial intermediation tends
to separate owners from managers more and more and thus to sharpen the distinction between pure
capital income and labor income." PIKETTY, supra note 6, at 424.
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The boundary between labor and capital has been extensively analyzed
in the scholarly debate about "carried interest"-the profits interest
received by a private equity fund manager as compensation for managerial
services.1 61 Under the partnership tax rules, the fund manager's receipt of a
profits interest is not immediately taxable. Instead, the fund manager
reports income in the future as the fund realizes profits, and the character
of those profits-usually capital gain-flows through to the fund
manager. 162 The debate about this result focuses on two questions: (1)
Whether fund managers should be taxed immediately upon receipt of the
profits interest, rather than being able to defer the tax until the fund
realizes profits; 163 and (2) whether all or a portion of the income should be
161. See Bradley T. Borden, Profits-Only Partnership Interests, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 1283 (2009);
Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits in Private Equity Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1 (2008); Gregg D. Polsky, Private Equity Management Fee Conversions, 122 TAX NOTES 743
(2009); Adam H. Rosenzweig, Not All Carried Interests Are Created Equal, 29 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS.
713 (2009); Chris William Sanchirico, The Tax Advantage to Paying Private Equity Fund Managers
with Profit Shares: What Is It? Why Is It Bad?, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1071 (2008) [hereinafter
Sanchirico, Tax Advantage]; Sanchirico, Taxing Carried Interest, supra note 45; David A. Weisbach,
The Taxation of Carried Interests in Private Equity, 94 VA. L. REV. 715 (2008); see also Laura E.
Cunningham, Taxing Partnership Interests Exchanged for Services, 47 TAx L. REV. 247 (1991); Mark
P. Gergen, Pooling or Exchange: The Taxation of Joint Ventures Between Labor and Capital, 44 TAx.
L. REV. 519 (1989) [hereinafter Gergen, Pooling]; Mark P. Gergen, Reforming Subchapter K:
Compensating Service Partners, 48 TAx L. REV. 69 (1992) [hereinafter Gergen, Service Partners];
Henry Ordower, Taxing Service Partners to Achieve Horizontal Equity, 46 TAx LAW. 19 (1992); Leo
L. Schmolka, Commentary, Taxing Partnership Interests Exchanged for Services: Let
Diamond/Campbell Quietly Die, 47 TAX L. REV. 287 (1991).
162. See generally Weisbach, supra note 161, at 727-33 (describing how partnership profits
interests are taxed).
163. The first question relates primarily to determining the cost of the labor inputs provided by a
service partner whose compensation takes the form of a profits interest that is speculative and illiquid.
See Fleischer, supra note 161, at 38 ("The strongest argument for deferral is the difficulty of
measuring a partner's income on an accrual basis. This argument is especially strong in the context of
venture capital and private equity funds, where the underlying investments are illiquid.").
Beyond the specific situation of carried interest, determining the cost of labor inputs is often
difficult, especially for intellectual capital. This difficulty is addressed in the extensive literature
devoted to "knowledge management," that is how businesses can best account for and deploy their
human capital assets. See generally THOMAS H. DAVENPORT & LAURENCE PRUSAK, WORKING
KNOWLEDGE: How ORGANIZATIONS MANAGE WHAT THEY KNOW (1998); IKUJIRO NONAKA &
HiROTAKA TAKEUCHI, THE KNOWLEDGE-CREATING COMPANY: How JAPANESE COMPANIES CREATE
THE DYNAMICS OF INNOVATION (1995); SVEIBY, supra note 40. The vast literature on intellectual
capital and knowledge management is evidenced by several journals dedicated to the subject,
including the Journal of Intellectual Capital, the Journal of Knowledge Management, and Knowledge
and Process Management. In addition, there are innumerable books, articles, and reports on the
subject.
For example, the creation of a new inventory system might involve the efforts of many different
employees whose work effort is spread among many tasks and projects. It might also include investing
in new computer software and hardware. It would be difficult to determine how much of each worker's
labor should be allocated to the creation of the new inventory system. However, the difference
between the carried interest situation and this example is that there is no need to allocate an
640
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taxed as ordinary income, like most other compensation income, rather
than as capital gain.
This second question relates to the demarcation between income from
labor and income from capital. 164 Critics of the current tax law's treatment
of carried interest argue that some or all of the service partner's income
represents compensation for services, and as such, should be taxed as
ordinary income.165 In response, other scholars have pointed out that the
tax system often allows such a conversion of labor income into capital
gain, specifically in the case of so-called sweat equity. 66 Sweat equity
arises when an individual provides labor to his own business, drawing no
salary or a below-market salary. If he ultimately sells the business, he will
in many cases realize a capital gain, thereby converting his foregone
salary, which would have been taxed as ordinary income, into capital
gain.' 67 Examples of sweat equity often involve sole proprietors such as
grocers or dry cleaners, but as David Weisbach points out, Bill Gates is an
owner of sweat equity: his fortune is attributable to services he performed
for Microsoft, but most of his earnings will be taxed as capital gains.' 68 In
light of this widespread ability to convert self-supplied labor into capital
gain, Weisbach argues, it is irrational to single out carried interest as
objectionable. 169
It is beyond the scope of this Article to undertake a full analysis of the
carried interest debate. Rather, this Article extends the debate's insights
about how self-supplied labor is converted into capital gains beyond the
employee's salary among the assets she helps to create or enhance in order to determine the amount of
compensation she receives, assuming she is paid in cash.
164. This question also arises in connection with so-called entrepreneurial income-that is,
income of a sole proprietor who contributes both labor and capital to her business. Piketty gives the
example of a radiologist, whose income derives from both her labor and the equipment she uses. See
PIKETTY, supra note 6, at 204; see also Kleinbard, supra note 5. However, according to Piketty,
entrepreneurial income accounts for a very small proportion of income-one to two percent. See
PIKETTY, supra note 6, at 204.
165. See Fleischer, supra note 161, at 37; Gergen, Service Partners, supra note 161, at 103-11.
166. See Fleischer, supra note 161, at 28; Weisbach, supra note 161, at 744.
167. See Fleischer, supra note 161, at 35-36.
168. Weisbach, supra note 161, at 743-44 n.70. Weisbach identifies two factors that determine
when labor income will be converted into capital gains: "First, the more entrepreneurial the activity,
the more likely the treatment will be capital. Second, the more that labor and capital are combined into
a single return, the more likely it will be treated as capital." Weisbach, supra note 161, at 743 n.70. As
discussed below, I disagree with him with regard to the second factor. Capital owners are able to
convert labor of workers into capital all the time. See also Leandra Lederman, supra note 132(finding
that the tax law subsidizes entrepreneurs, that is, those who contribute both labor and capital, as
compared to passive investors, who contribute only capital).
169. Weisbach argues further that the line between capital gains and ordinary income exemplifies
the sort of arbitrary line drawing found in tax law, as do many aspects of partnership taxation.
Weisbach, supra note 161, at 743-63.
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limited situation of self-supplied labor. More broadly, as the discussion of
intellectual capital shows, capital owners convert other people's labor-
that of their workers-into capital through the process of propertization.
Furthermore, the tax law subsidizes this process by allowing capital
owners to deduct the costs of creating intellectual capital.
Chris Sanchirico makes this same observation about the broader
phenomenon of the conversion of labor into capital gain in his analysis of
carried interest. He argues that it is fruitless to analogize carried interest to
sweat equity on the grounds that both allow for the tax-advantaged
conversion of labor income into capital gains. It is fruitless, he argues,
because virtually everyone enjoys this tax-advantaged conversion of labor
into capital gain, even capital owners who do not provide their own labor,
by reason of the immediate deductibility of labor costs:
"[J]udging from how the supposed sweat equity tax advantage has
been described, one of its seemingly essential features is that it
accrues specifically to services that are self-provided .... Yet the
tax benefit of premature labor cost recovery is hardly dependent on
labor's being self-provided. The salaries a business pays to
employees who work in the marketing department building a brand
name are likely expensed, even though the brand name may
eventually garner long-term capital gains income. Indeed, the salary
of every employee whose services help to keep the concern going is
to some extent an investment in going concern value.
170
Although Sanchirico's analysis does not refer to the ability of capital
owners to propertize labor into intellectual capital, this is exactly what he
describes when he alludes to the ability of business owners who pay
workers to produce a brand name or going concern value. 171 Furthermore,
Sanchirico's argument assumes that business owners can deduct
immediately their workers' salaries despite the fact that the workers
contribute to the creation of assets of long-term value. This is exactly the
tax subsidy for self-created intellectual capital that this Article identifies as
a subsidy to the process of propertization.
170. Sanchirico, Taxing Carried Interest, supra note 45, at 242.
171. Sanchirico argues further that supposed tax benefit that all these parties enjoy-the ability to
convert labor income into capital gains-is illusory when one takes into account the aggregate tax paid
by all participants. According to Sanchirico, the true tax advantage to carried interest inheres in
exploiting the tax rate differentials of fund managers and investors. See Sanchirico, Tax Advantage,
supra note 161, at 1076.
[VOL. 94:607
WHO OWNS HUMAN CAPITAL?
B. Returns on Human Capital
As Part II discussed, the legal landscape related to intellectual capital is
shifting the boundary between labor and capital and enabling capital
owners to capture a greater share of economic returns. This suggests that
capital owners are in some sense able to capture some of the returns to
labor.17 2 This is a somewhat confusing statement because purely as a
definitional matter, "returns to labor" describes the amount received by
workers and "returns to capital", the amount received by capital owners.
1 73
However, the process of propertization shows how capital owners capture
at least some of the returns to labor. Furthermore, capital owners make
investments in human capital, and presumably they receive returns on
these investments. 174 Therefore, it is reasonable to say that capital owners
receive some of the returns to labor.
If it is true that capital owners capture some of the returns to labor, this
calls into question the tax law's distinction between income from labor
and income from capital, along with its disparate treatment of the two
categories. Not all income from labor is subject to onerous taxation
relative to income from capital. Rather, income from labor paid to workers
is taxed heavily. Income paid to capital owners, whether attributable to
labor or capital, is taxed lightly. Thus, income from labor is taxed very
differently depending on who receives the return from the labor.
Under this view, one could reframe the tax treatment of capital owners
and workers to say that they are taxed differently on their respective shares
of income from labor. 175 This refraining matters because it requires us to
re-evaluate the rationales for taxing income from labor so differently from
172. Employment law scholars who criticize employer restrictions on employees frame the
analysis in terms of who should be entitled to reap the benefits of the worker's labor, employer or
worker. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 49, at 721-23.
173. See, e.g., PIKETrY, supra note 6, at 203 (discussing the clear distinction between
remuneration of labor (wages, salaries, bonuses, and other payments to employees, including
managers, who contribute labor to the company's activities) and remuneration of capital (dividends,
interest, profits reinvested to increase the value of the firms' capital, etc.); Kleinbard, supra note 5, at
49 ("[T]he suppliers of labor and capital can be expected to define for themselves the relative
contributions of each through the process of setting wages; the post-compensation remainder by
definition must be capital income.").
174. Knowledge management scholars frame questions of employee mobility around the idea of
protecting firms from expropriation of value and/or ensuring that firms protect their human capital
investments and gamer the returns from those investments. See, e.g., Younge, supra note 77, at 2-6.
175. Conversely, one might also characterize part of workers' income as a return on capital, as in
the case of entrepreneurial income or carried interest.
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income from capital. 176 On an intuitive level, it seems irrational and unfair
that the tax treatment of labor income should turn on the identity of the
person-worker or capital owner-who derives the income from labor.
17 7
Beyond intuition, taxing the workers more heavily than capital owners on
their respective share of returns to labor seems clearly to exacerbate "rich-
get-richer dynamic" 178 documented by Piketty.
C. Workers and Capital Owners as Joint Venturers
The tax law's distinct treatment of income from labor and income from
capital assumes that the economic production can be disaggregated into
these two types of income. 179 However, the discussion of intellectual
capital highlights the interdependent relationship between labor and capital
in economic productivity. This interdependence raises the question
whether labor income and capital income can or should be viewed as
separate types of income.
Carried interest provides a useful jumping off point to consider this
question. In their analyses of carried interest, scholars argue that at least
part of what the service partner receives is compensation for his labor, and
should therefore be taxed as such.180 The difficulty lies in determining how
much of what the services partner receives should be treated this way. As
Victor Fleischer puts it, "the key challenge is disaggregating the relative
value of the returns on human capital, which we would presumably like to
tax currently as the services are performed, from the returns on investment
capital, which we would like to tax only when the income is realized." 181
176. Victor Fleischer makes a related argument in the context of what he calls "alpha income"-
carried interest, founders stock, and equity-based executive compensation. He argues that alpha
income is labor income disguised as capital income and that the best way to achieve an equitable tax
treatment of this disguised labor income would be to repeal the capital gains preference. See Fleischer,
supra note 160, at 28, 42. Fleischer's argument differs from the views advanced in this Article in that
Fleischer accepts the assumption that labor income and capital income are fixed and distinct
categories.
177. On the other hand, we treat trade or business income differently from investor gains, so the
identity of the person who derives the income does matter sometimes. However, this example may
devolve back to the same suspect classifications of labor income and capital income because trade or
business income implies a requisite level of labor activity in its production.
178. Robert Solow coined this term to describe Piketty's thesis. Solow, supra note 11.
179. According to Fleischer, public finance economists also regularly make this assumption. See
Fleischer, supra note 160, at 10.
180. See Fleiseher, supra note 161, at 47; Gergen, Service Partners, supra note 161, at 103-11.
181. Fleischer, supra note 161, at4l.
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In response to this disaggregation challenge, Borden argues that it is
impossible to disaggregate returns on labor and returns on capital where
partners contribute a mix of labor and capital:
The co-ownership of partnership property and services makes
tracing income from either the contributed property or services to
the contributor impossible. A tax partnership's income flows from
the combined output of partnership property and services, over both
of which the partners share control. Sharing control and the residual
claims of integrated property and services gives partnerships their
distinctive nature. In particular, the parties cannot trace income
from its source to a single owner of the source.
182
In Borden's view, this inability to disaggregate explains why income from
the combined sources should be treated as partnership income. To be
characterized at the partnership level: "The partners cannot separately
trace income from property and services. The income from one source
fuses with the income from the other source. The income from the
combined sources becomes partnership income and flows to the partners
with the character determined at the partnership level."' 83
Borden's observation about the inseparability of labor income and
capital income has a broader applicability, particularly as it relates to
intellectual capital, where labor and capital are deeply intertwined.' 84 In
view of the increasing prevalence of intellectual capital, one can question
182. Borden, supra note 161, at 1300. More generally, other scholars have explored at length
whether and to what extent the tax law should treat a partnership as a pooling of partners' services and
property, or alternatively, as an exchange of their services and property. See, e.g., Gergen, Pooling,
supra note 161.
183. Borden, supra note 161, at 1301 (footnotes omitted). In Borden's view, the inability to
disaggregate is at the heart of the partnership rules allowing partners to allocate income freely among
themselves, seemingly in contravention of assignment of income principles:
Partnership tax law recognizes the inability to trace partnership income from its source and
allows partners to allocate partnership tax items in any reasonable manner. Normally any
income from the property should be income to the property owner and income from services
should be income to the service provider. Tax law cannot impose that rule in the partnership
context because it cannot trace income from property and services. The allocation rules are,
therefore, a compromise between the assignment-of-income doctrine and the inability to
trace.
Id. at 1302-03 (footnotes omitted).
184. Borden limits his claim about the inseparability of labor income and capital income to the
context of partnership carried interest. He further limits his analysis to services partnerships in which
tracing problems are unavoidable. Thus, for example, he believes pure investment partnerships do not
have tracing problems and should therefore be accorded less flexibility than service-property
partnerships. See id. at 1303. Furthermore, he explains at length that his rationale for supporting the
current law treatment of carried interest does not extend to equity-based corporate compensation. See
id. at 1304-10.
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more generally whether the tax law's distinction between labor income
and capital income is useful, or even meaningful. As an alternative,
analogizing to Borden, we could conceptualize capital owners and workers
as participants in a joint venture who share in an inseparable, unitary
return derived from their combined resources. This conception reflects the
interdependent relationship between capital and labor in economic
production and acknowledges the difficulty, perhaps impossibility, of
disaggregating this collaborative return into two streams of income, one
deriving from labor and the other, from capital. 18
5
Under a joint venture conception of workers and capital owners, the
terms "labor income" and "capital income" would not refer to distinct,
qualitatively different types of income, but rather would describe how
workers and capital owners share the return derived from their
collaboration. 186 This would necessitate the reevaluation of the tax law's
preferential treatment of capital owners. With respect to the preferential
treatment of their costs of producing income, the tax law should be
amended to eliminate the immediate deduction for expenditures such as
R&D and advertising, which subsidizes capital owners' creation of
intellectual capital. 87 In addition, as Mary Louise Fellows and I have
proposed, the tax treatment of workers' and capital owners' investments in
human capital, such as education, should be equalized, and other of
workers' human capital costs, such as healthcare and childcare, should be
recognized as valid costs of producing income. 88 With respect to the
preferential treatment of capital owners' income, the tax preference for
capital gains and dividends should be eliminated.' 89
A joint venture conception of workers and capital owners would also
align the tax law with efforts in other legal fields to reframe doctrinal and
policy analysis to recognize the centrality of workers in economic
production. 9 ° Scholars in fields outside of tax have proposed a similar
185. This is not to say that a disaggregation scheme couldn't be devised. Rather, my point is that
joint venture conception leads to different policy choices. For a recent disaggregation proposal, see
Note, Taxing Partnership Profits Interests: The Carried Interest Problem, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1773
(2011); see also Kleinbard, supra note 5, at 49-52 (discussing the "labor-capital income centrifuge"
for disaggregating entrepreneurial income into labor and capital components). Rather, my point is that
joint venture conception leads to different policy choices.
186. The terms "income from labor" and "income from capital" are misleading because they
imply that income can be disaggregated.
187. See Kahng, supra note 80, at 2274-77.
188. See Fellows & Kahng, supra note 140, at 391-99.
189. See Fleischer, supra note 160, at 41.
190. See e.g., Kent Greenfield, The Place of Workers in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L. REV. 283
(1998); Marleen A. O'Connor, The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate Law to
Facilitate Labor-Management Cooperation, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 899 (1993); Katherine Van Wezel
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joint venture model of workers and capital owners. For example, in her
work about how legal doctrines empower employers to control and
appropriate returns on knowledge workers' labor, Catherine Fisk
suggested a new metaphor for intellectual property, which would
conceptualize employees and employers as "joint authors" of proprietary
knowledge, human capital, or firm intellectual property. 91 Margaret Blair
and Lynn Stout theorized a "team production" model of corporate
governance that conceptualizes the public corporation as a team of
stakeholders including shareholders, workers, creditors, and communities.
The premise of their model is that all the stakeholders contribute to a
product of corporate enterprise that is nonseparable and nontraceable to
the individual team members' contributions. 1
92
CONCLUSION
This Article has endeavored to challenge the tax law's foundational,
yet mostly unexamined, distinction between labor and capital by focusing
on the process by which workers and capital owners collaborate in
economic production and the ways in which legal rules, including the tax
law, shape their entitlements to the rewards of that collaboration. It argues
that the labor-capital distinction is changeable and porous, and perhaps
even illusory, and that workers and capital owners should be viewed as
sharing in a collaborative economic product that is not separable into two
streams of income, one attributable to labor and the other to capital.
This revised view of the labor-capital distinction has profound
implications for the tax law, a full exploration of which the Article leaves
Stonc, Employees as Stakeholders Under State Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 21 STETSON L.
REv. 45 (1991).
191. See Fisk, supra note 69, at 862-63.
192. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L.
REv. 247, 265-66 (1999). Their theory is grounded on Armen Alehian and Harold Demsetz's
definition of team production as "production in which 1) several types of resources are used ... 2) the
product is not a sum of separable outputs of each cooperating resource ... [and] 3) not all resources
used in team production belong to one person." Id at 265 (quoting Armen A. Alehian & Harold
Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REv. 777, 779
(1972)); see also Matthew T. Bodie, Employees and Boundaries of the Corporation, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 85, 85-105 (2011) (describing developments in
an employee-centered theory of the firm using examples from tort law, intellectual property law, and
tax law); Brett H. McDonnell, Employee Primacy, or Economics Meets Civic Republicanism at Work,
13 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 334 (2008); Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Tailored Claims and
Governance: The Fit between Employees and Shareholders, in EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 121, 143-56 (Margaret M. Blair & Mark J. Roe eds., 1999) (questioning the prevailing
view that employees have no residual claims to corporations and finding instead that they have
significant ownership and governance rights).
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for future research. However, in contrast to proposals such as Piketty's for
a new global wealth tax, many of the specific reform prescriptions that
flow from this Article would not require drastic changes to our tax laws.
Rather, the problematic tax subsidies for capital owners and incongruities
in the taxation of capital and workers identified in the Article are
remediable within the strictures of the current law. We could reform the
law to require capitalization of the costs of creating intellectual capital, as
was recently proposed by the Senate Finance Committee and the House
Ways and Means Committee. 193 This change could even be implemented
through an executive reversal of the INDOPCO regulations. Similarly, we
could introduce reforms that would treat more uniformly and equitably
capital owners' and workers' investments in human capital. 194 Although
these changes seem modest on their face, they would have an immediate
and significant impact in the distribution of taxes between capital owners
and workers. Furthermore, they would represent a major step toward
recognizing the centrality of workers in economic productivity and
reconceptualizing the relationship between capital owners and workers,
not as between master and servant, but as partners.
193. See supra note 129 and accompanying text; Kahng, supra note 80, at 2274-77.
194. See Fellows & Kahng, supra note 140, at 394-99.
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